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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of  this paper is to raise useful, critical questions and offer practical conceptual elaborations in 
order to strengthen Twaweza's work around four key areas that animate the organization's mission: citizen 
agency, access to information, monitoring and accountability, and the improvement of  basic services in East 
Africa.   This is not intended to be a comprehensive literature review on these broad and far-ranging 
concepts; such work is beyond the scope of  this study and, in many cases, has already been done.1  Our task, 
instead, has been to engage with Twaweza's ideas, drawing on relevant academic and practitioner literature to 
generate fresh perspectives on the organization's work that we hope will be useful in its learning process.  
This paper is also not intended to offer specific policy or strategy suggestions to Twaweza.   We seek to raise 
questions, identify issues and and challenges, and offer concepts and ideas that might be useful.   We leave to 
Twaweza the work of  translating these offerings into changes in strategy, approach, and framing.   We offer 
this work in the spirit of  Twaweza's intention to "reflect on practice and develop cultures of  learning."2  
 
We began our research by identifying the key elements of  Twaweza's model of  change, listening to the key 
questions that the organization is asking about itself  and its work, and then seeking those places in the 
literature of  academics and reflective development practitioners where these elements and questions have 
been researched, debated, and further developed.   In our investigation—spanning a wide spectrum of  fields 
including development practice and theory, anthropology, economics, political science, communication and 
information theory, and cognitive science—we have sought to open ourselves to new questions and 
perspectives as they arise.   This has facilitated both a process of  unpacking complexities from the key 
elements of  Twaweza's work and of  developing new questions that might inform and transform that work.   
We hope that Twaweza's staff  will find this report to be helpfully challenging and challengingly helpful.   
 
One challenge we have faced in our engagement with this research is that Twaweza is a moving target.   Quite 
appropriately for an organization dedicated to fostering "a culture of  learning and self-critique," Twaweza's 
key documents articulating its approach to change have changed significantly over the course of  this project.   
"Which Twaweza are we engaging with?" is a question that we have continually asked.   Our choice has been 
to engage with all of  organizational documents and media materials to which we have access,3  allowing our 
                         
1 See, for example, the following literature reviews: on citizenship: Jones and Gaventa 2002; on agency and 
empowerment: Samman and Santos 2009; on access to information: McCreadie and Rice 1999a, McCreadie and 
Rice 1999b; on accountability: Newell and Bellour 2002; O'Neil, Floresti and Hudson 2007; and on accountability, 
voice, and service delivery: Goetz and Gaventa 2001.   
2 Twaweza. "Our Work," www.twaweza.org, accessed 8/5/10).   
3 We very much recognize the limitations of  such an approach, since it does not engage Twaweza in terms of  the 
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questions to emerge from this broad view of  evolving concepts and recognizing that Twaweza is not a static, 
fixed entity, but an organization engaged in a process of  learning and development.   In a number of  cases, 
we have seen Twaweza make important shifts from earlier articulations of  ideas toward more nuanced and 
critically-considered perspectives.   We try, in this report, to acknowledge these developments and to build on 
them.     
 
The paper begins with an overview and general analysis of  Twaewza's framework for change.   We offer this 
overview as a way to be clear about our starting point and our assumptions, so that readers can better 
understand the critical approach that we take in later sections.   Following this "big picture" sketch, we engage 
directly with the four key dimensions of  Twaweza's work—citizen agency, access to information, monitoring 
and accountability, and the improvement of  basic services—and with the linkages between them.   In each 
section, we provide an overview of  Twaweza's current approach to the concept, discuss critical issues and 
debates raised by the relevant literatures, and then offer questions for Twaweza—sparked by these debates—
that we believe can be useful in its organizational learning and development.    
 
 
II. TWAWEZA'S FRAMEWORK  
 
Twaweza is a Swahili word that means "we can make it happen."  This is the spirit that Twaweza the 
organization—working in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya to "foster conditions and expand opportunities 
through which millions of  people can get information and make change happen in their own communities 
directly and by holding government to account"4—seeks to bring to its project of  large-scale citizen 
engagement.   The organization has a mission that is founded on three core goals, all aimed at achieving 
impact among millions of  people and across the whole geographical span of  East Africa: first, to increase 
peoples' abilities to "access, generate and broker information"; second, to enhance and catalyze "citizen 
agency" as both an end in itself  and as a means to achieve the other two goals; and third, to enable the 
improvement of  basic services—primarily healthcare, water, and basic education—through citizen 
monitoring and action for accountability.   These goals are linked together by Twaweza's "theory of  change" 
which, in a number of  documents that have been published on the organization's website, outlines ways in 
which Twaweza understands processes of  change and its role in catalyzing them.   
 
A. TWO THEORIES OF CHANGE 
 
Before exploring the theory of  change, however, it is important to recognize that there are two distinct levels 
of  theory at play.   On one hand, we have Twaweza's theory about how citizen-driven change happens; that is, an 
idea about how "ordinary people" make change through interconnected processes relating to information, 
citizen agency, monitoring and accountability.   It is this theory that animates Twaweza's choices in regard to 
areas of  focus and how those areas are understood and linked together.   On the other hand, we have 
Twaweza's theory of  how it as an organization makes change.   This is notably distinct from the first theory, 
utilizing vocabulary of  concepts such as brokering, leveraging, and partnerships, and an "ecoystem of  
change."5  It is this theory that informs Twaweza's strategic decisions regarding how it will engage with its 
areas of  focus and their interrelationships.   We note this distinction at the outset because we believe that it 
may be an important and challenging source of  tension for the organization in implementing its goals.   The 
two theories may together embody many of  the difficulties to be found in attempting to straddle the "two 
worlds" of  "the domain of  everyday life"6 and the domain of  international donor-driven development.   
 
                                                                               
actual work happening "on the ground."  We have done our best, in the absence of  such direct connection with the 
organization's work, with the materials and resources at our disposal.   
4 Twaweza website, http://www.twaweza.org/.  Accessed 8/5/10. 
5 Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?", p.2.   
6 Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?", p2.   
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B. ECOSYSTEMS OF CHANGE 
 
Twaweza describes its overall approach as that of  cultivating "ecosystems of  change" and describes their use 
of  this phrase like this: "Ecosystems and ecology are metaphors for the dynamic interconnectedness of  
people, resources, structures and institutions, and the networks, niches, flows and pathways of  information 
and communication."7  Viewing social processes in such terms, Twaweza explicitly frames the four key 
domains of  citizen agency, information, monitoring and accountability, and improvement of  basic services—
and, presumably, the linkages between them—as having nonlinear relationships.   These domains do not 
necessarily lead one to the other in a simple chain of  connection, "nor are the links between them necessarily 
causal."8  Rather these links are "iterative, synergistic and dependent on frequent feedback loops at small 
(local) and at large (regional/provincial and national) scales."9  The goal of  Twaweza's interventions in its key 
areas of  focus are to help generate "a continually, reinforcing buzz"10 that can enable many people, in many 
different ways, to act to improve their lives.   While it is not within the scope of  this paper to engage the 
concept of  "ecosystem of  change" directly and thoroughly, we do believe it is important to make a few brief  
comments about it.   
 
First, while important, innovative, and potentially powerful, Twaweza's use of  both the ecosystem metaphor 
and notions drawn from complex adaptive systems theory (feedback, synergy, networks, complexity, and non-
linearity) need to be further developed.   "Ecosystem of  change" is currently used in a way that simply 
indicates the field of  work to be complex and networked, suggests that causal connections between 
Twaweza's dimensions of  focus and its hoped-for outcomes are difficult to trace, supports a strategy of  
linking actors together in some form of  network, and indicates a strategy that involves working with large-
scale players "that reach at least two million people."11  
 
We are concerned that this current articulation of  "ecosystem of  change" does not adequately address crucial 
questions such as the specific nature of  the complexity being engaged, the methods that will be used for 
tracing impact in a complexity context, the specific nature and forms of  the networks and linkages that are to 
be built, and the choices involved in this work.12  The apparent link that Twaweza makes between 
"ecosystem" and scale is also under-developed; why, we wish to ask, would an ecosystem approach necessarily 
lead to a choice to only engage "large-scale" actors?13  A related and more general concern is that notions of  
feedback, non-linearity, and complexity—when not defined clearly and utilized carefully—can appear as 
substitutes for substantive reflection and strategy allowing an organization to make claims about impact and 
causality that—because they are "complex and non-linear"—are difficult to substantiate in practice.   We do 
not mean to suggest that Twaweza utilizes these concepts to side-step responsibility for measuring or tracing 
social impact; rather, we flag this area as a realm where the organization might benefit (both in terms of  its 
public presentation and its actual practice) from clarifying terms and concepts.   
 
A second concern in regard to the "ecosystem of  change" concept is in regard to its place in Twaweza's 
theories of  change.   We believe that the ecosystem concept is the key link between Twaweza's theory of  
citizen-driven change and its theory of  organizational intervention (discussed above).   This is implied in 
Twaweza's descriptions of  its work, but needs to be made explicit.   What is the relationship between a 
citizen-driven model of  change and a model of  "ecosystem" intervention that focuses on engaging big 
                         
7 Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p2.   
8 Twaweza.  "Concept Note: Twaweza External Evaluation." July 26, 2010.   
9 Twaweza.  "Concept Note: Twaweza External Evaluation." July 26, 2010.   
10 Twaweza.  "Twaweza Criteria for Program Partnerships/Initiatives".  p1.   
11 Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p8.   
12 For a general presentation of  some of  the dimensions and nuances of  an "ecosystems approach," see Bloom and 
Dees 2008.   
13 There is much in ecosystem theory that suggests a more nuanced and multi-scale approach.  See, for example: 
Holyoak, Liebold and Holt 2005; Paulson and Gezon 2005.   
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players?  How is the concept of  "ecosystem of  change" used to justify, in the name of  citizen-driven change, 
social interventions that take place primarily in collaboration with large-scale partners that are not necessarily 
citizen-controlled or community-based organizations?  There may, indeed, be good reasons why Twaweza 
makes such choices, but these deliberations should be self-conscious and public.   What are the possible 
political tensions that might be buried in the use of  the ecosystem model to describe these strategic choices?  
What are other possible ecosystem-based approaches that might be taken and why has Twaweza made these 
particular choices and not others?  What are the trade-offs and dangers that Twaweza recognizes in taking its 
specific approach?  Addressing such questions, we propose, is very much in the spirit of  Twaweza's values 
and mission.   
 
We will not explore these ideas further in this paper, though we encourage Twaweza to charge future 
collaborating researchers with this task.   In the pages to follow, we will simply examine each key dimension 
of  Twaweza's theory of  citizen-driven change and the links between them, engaging relevant literature, raising 
questions, and offering ideas.   
 
C. CITIZEN-DRIVEN CHANGE 
 
The primary task of  this paper is to explore Twaweza's theory of  "citizen-driven change," and it is this 
exploration which will structure the paper, and to this theory that we now turn.14  Twaweza's three 
organizational goals as outlined above are understood by the organization to be fully interconnected "social 
processes."15  In Twaweza's model of  "citizen-driven change,"16 access to information—in the form of  
information about rights, laws and entitlements, information about conditions in other places, and stories of  
"ordinary people making a difference"17—enables citizens to understand their options, imagine new 
possibilities and to take action to change their situations.  Such citizen action, for Twaweza, is precisely what 
is needed in order for basic service provision in East Africa to be significantly improved: "Twaweza has been 
established on the basis that more than top-down reform is needed—we need citizen involvement and 
oversight."18  This is a circular process in which "we therefore see citizen agency, better services, improved 
resource management and accountability as mutually reinforcing."19  Figure 1 shows a basic representation of  
this change model.   
 
Figure 1. Twaweza’s Model of  Change. 
Source: http://Twaweza.org 
 
This three-part model does not, however, fully reflect the 
dimensions of  Twaweza's approach.   A fourth element must be 
introduced to complete the model: citizen monitoring and action 
for accountability.   It is this dimension on which Twaweza places 
particular emphasis as a vehicle through which citizen agency 
effectively improves basic service provision.  "This initiative," 
states Twaweza, "will focus on enabling citizens to monitor funds, 
services, practice and outcomes at both community and national 
levels."20  This monitoring is at once a source of  information, an 
expression of  agency, and a vehicle for "exercising voice" in 
                         
14 Other issues, including some of  those raised by Twaweza's strategic organizational approach, will be addressed as 
they arise in the context of  unpacking this core "citizen-driven change" theory.   
15 Twaweza.  ""Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?", p.2.   
16 Twaweza Kenya Facebook page, http://www.facebook.com/pages/TWAWEZA-KENYA/168569261600.  Accessed 
8/5/10.   
17 Twaweza.  ""Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?", p.3.   
18 Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?", p.2.   
19 Twaweza.  "Theory of  Change and Approach." p.2.   
20 Twaweza.  "Theory of  Change and Approach." p.9.   
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improving services.21  While it is not at all the only expression of  citizen agency recognized by Twaweza, it is 
certainly a central one.   Figure 2 shows a more elaborated representation of  Twaweza's citizen-driven change 
model that includes this monitoring and accountability element.   
 
Looking at this version of  the model, we can see that, while there are four distinct yet interconnected 
domains of  action that can be explored and further understood, there are also four areas of  "linkage" that 
form the crucial connections between each domain.  These linkages are a set of  assertions that hold the 
model together and can be summarized in a simple form as follows:  
 
Figure 2: Twaweza's Model of  Citizen-Driven Change, Elaborated 
 
• Access to information enhances citizen agency. 
• Citizen agency is effectively expressed, in part, through monitoring and action for accountability.   
• Monitoring and accountability action leads to improved basic services.   
• Improved basic services, through access to information (and other mechanisms) supports and 
enhances citizen agency. 
 
With these crucial linkages in mind—each of  which needs to be further explored—we can offer a further 
elaborated visual version of  Twaweza's model of  citizen-driven change (Figure 3).   
                         
21 Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?", p.5.   
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Figure 3: Eight Dimensions of  Twaweza's Citizen-Driven Change Model 
 
Twaweza's circular model of  change presents challenges to us as sympathetic critics that we believe may also 
present challenges to Twaweza in its work.   Looking at the four key dimensions of  change, we are tempted to 
ask which of  these is the "primary goal" of  the organization?  Viewing "access to information" and 
"monitoring and action for accountability" as means to ends (since neither seems to stand alone as a goal of  
social change), we then wonder: Is Twaweza seeking, fundamentally, to improve citizen agency?  Is Twaweza 
seeking, above all else, to improve basic services?  We suspect—particularly because of  the circularity of  the 
model and the adoption of  a non-linear discourse about change—that the organization would resist having to 
make such a choice between priorities.   Yet what trade-offs might be necessary in the absence of  a central 
focus?  As we shall see later in this paper, a thorough strategic examination of  pathways to increasing citizen 
agency in East Africa may or may not lead to information-based monitoring interventions that target basic 
services.   Similarly, such an examination of  basic service provision may not lead to interventions that were 
focused solely on information-activated citizen agency.   We recognize, then, that the circular model—and 
perhaps the ecosystem concept to which it is linked—may involve certain strategic choices that have the 
potential to simultaneously spread the effects of  Twaweza's work widely (across a broad spectrum of  spheres, 
recognizing some key interconnections) and also dampen these effects in any given sphere due to the diffused 
focus.   In other words, Twaweza can only do so much.   Choosing to work on all four spheres at once simply 
means that the organization cannot focus on the broad spectrum of  interventions that might be necessary to 
maximize transformative potential in any one sphere.    
 
As writers, this challenge is reflected in the question of  "where to begin"?  While much of  Twaweza's 
literature appears to begin with access to information as a focus, we also find citizen agency to be a central 
theme.   Though conflicting interpretations can be made, we are inclined to read many of  the organization's 
texts as placing citizen agency at the center.   One of  Twaweza's core statements, expressed in a number of  
documents, is the vision that "ordinary citizens can become the drivers of  their own development and act as 
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co-creators of  democracy."22  Citizen agency appears as both the goal of  development and the most effective 
means by which it can be achieved.   We will begin, therefore, with an exploration of  citizen agency.   
 
D. KEY QUESTIONS ON SOCIAL CHANGE 
 
• Does Twaweza have a primary goal in terms of  social change – between enhancing citizen agency 
and improving basic services? If  not, how will it handle strategic and programmatic trade-offs  in 
pursuing both goals?   
 
• What processes will effectively work through the tensions between a focus on local citizen-driven 
change and a programmatic strategy directed at ecosystem change?  
 
• How will the ecosystem concept be measured?   
 
 
III. CITIZEN AGENCY 
 
A.  CITIZENS AND CITIZENSHIP: AGENTS OF CHANGE 
 
Who are the agents of  change for Twaweza?  Citizens.   Ordinary citizens.   "Twaweza's core aim is...to build 
on what ordinary citizens are already doing and expand the space for everyday citizen action."23  Citizens—
and, by association, concepts of  citizenship—hold a prominent place in Twaweza's story about how change 
happens, who makes it happen, and how it can be supported by donors and NGOs.   But who, exactly, are 
these "ordinary citizens"?  What does it mean to invoke the concepts of  "citizen" and "citizenship" in naming 
social change agents?  The terms may often appear to be self-evident or simple, implying a consensus about 
their definition.   "Citizen" and "citizenship," as Jones and Gaventa point out, "have often come to offer to 
everybody what they would like to understand them to mean."24  Yet, below the surface, these words are in 
fact highly loaded, contested, and heavy with power-laden meaning.   They reflect important assumptions and 
assertions about the nature of  power, rights, identity, community, and social change.   It is crucial, therefore, 
that we unpack some of  the ways in which Twaweza uses these concepts, investigate key questions that arise 
and explore pathways by which the organization might further clarify its "theory of  citizenship."  We begin, 
then, a key question:  
 
¾ What are “citizenship” and “agency” for Twaweza and how are these conceptions positioned 
in relationship to a broader field of  scholarship on notions and practices of  citizenship?  
 
Twaweza's concept of  citizenship is not made explicit as such in its public documents.   Indeed, on the 
surface "citizen" often appears to be used simply as a synonym of  "people," a term for "men, women and 
young people" who do things.25  This is a common use of  the term, as Jones and Gaventa point out, and is 
also often associated with "the act of  any person taking part in public affairs."26  Yet like many apparently 
simple terms, there is much more going on beneath the surface.   Twaweza does have a more specific notion 
of  citizenship that can be found as a set of  implicit suggestions made through the various attributes and 
activities associated with "ordinary citizens" throughout the organization's literature.   Here, we find a 
definition of  citizenship that is centered on rights-bearing individuals, entitled to government-provided basic 
                         
22 Twaweza.  "Theory of  Change and Approach." p.1.   
23 Twaweza.  "More Than a Thousand Miles.: Reflections on a Field Trip In the Lake Zone, Tanzania, October 2009." 
Pre-Publication Draft.  p.2.   
24 Jones and Gaventa 2002, 2.   
25 Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.2.   
26 Jones and Gaventa 2002, 2.   
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services, who are creative, active and, given the right contexts and resources, can exercise their agency to 
advocate for themselves.   
 
Concepts of  citizenship can be categorized by at least three sets of  distinctions:  theoretical concepts versus 
"lived" concepts; citizenship as status versus citizenship as practice; and vertical versus horizontal conceptions 
of  citizenship.   The distinction between theoretical and lived concepts is, perhaps, most primary and names 
the difference between academic theorizations and policy definitions of  citizenship on one hand, and, on the 
other, the ways in which people and communities understand and experience citizenship on a day-to-day 
basis.   The latter can only be understood in context, talking with people directly about their use of  the words 
"citizen" and "citizenship" and the ways in which they mobilize (or not) these concepts in daily life.27  The 
former can be understood in terms of  "schools" of  thought that have, in many cases, informed and been 
operationalized through various political structures and development strategies.   
 
Jones and Gaventa identify three primary traditions in this regard.28  In liberal thought, citizenship is 
understood as a status, defined by the possession of  rights granted by the state.   As rights-holders in this 
tradition, "individual citizens act 'rationally' to advance their own interests."29  The exercise of  rights is "seen 
as the choice of  citizens"30 and, to the extent that these choices are limited by resources and opportunities, 
government and other institutions can act to level the field upon which these choices and actions play out.   
 
In communitarian thought, citizenship is understood primarily as a form of  belonging, an identity built in and 
through virtuous, "civic" participation in a community.   It is this community (a village, an ethnic or religious 
group, a political group or a nation) which forms the context for the exercise of  citizenship, provides its 
validation, and is itself  constituted by it.   Finally, in civic republican thought, notions of  self-interested, rights-
bearing individuals and community belonging are linked together into a concept of  citizenship as a "common 
civic identity, shaped by a common public culture" in which participation in deliberative democracy is 
essential.   
 
In regard to these traditions of  thought, Twaweza's literature tends to articulate a conception of  citizenship 
that appears most in line with liberal thought.   First, it is clear that citizens, for Twaweza, are people who 
have rights.31  Citizenship is defined, at least in part, by a relationship of  entitlement to government-provided 
resources and basic services.   It is this conception that allows Twaweza to talk about citizens "holding 
government to account."32  Citizenship is also, importantly, represented in Twaweza's work as being primarily 
about individuals.   While the importance of  group connection and community is clearly acknowledged,33 
Twaweza's examples of  citizen agency are predominately about individual people obtaining (and, in recent 
documents, generating) information, taking action and making (or not making) changes.   The examples of  
                         
27 This approach is taken in Eyben and Ladbury 2006.   
28 Isin and Wood (1999, 7) note that these three traditions "map out the terrain rather uneasily because many scholars 
do not exactly fit into these categories." Nonetheless, for the purposes of  this paper, we believe—with Jones and 
Gaventa—that this schema can usefully help to orient us in a complex and potentially confusing terrain of  
scholarship.   
29 Jones and Gaventa 2002, 3.   
30 Jones and Gaventa 2002, 3.   
31 Though Twaweza's approach is not explicitly positioned in the realm of  development discourse known as "rights-
based development," its implicit assumptions about citizenship do seem to link it to such discourses.  These 
connections will be discussed further, below.   
32 Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.2.  This notion is also reflected in Twaweza's description of  its 
work with partners: "Twaweza partners will seek to help citizens reclaim government and animate public institutions, 
and over time develop a new, more responsive 'compact' between citizens and the state" ("Theory of  Change and 
Approach," p.4).   
33 See, for example, "More Than a Thousand Miles" where it is acknowledged that Twaweza "must also understand the 
bonds that tie people together that may simultaneously enhance and constrain action." (p.10).   
Miller, Hartwell & Rossman, Unpacking Twaweza’s Theory of  Social Change                                   page 8 
 
social innovation described in "More than a Thousand Miles,"34 the story of  Asha and Juma in the "Theory 
of  Change and Approach,"35 and the rational calculating citizen agent presented in "Unpacking the Theory 
of  Change"36 are all examples of  the kinds of  "individual citizen stories" that figure prominently in 
Twaweza's discussions.   Citizens are seen to receive information, to process information, to decide to act, 
and to effect change as individuals, as "citizen leaders" who "may be teachers, local entrepreneurs, or 
members of  a faith community or informal savings association."37  Community is present, but as a context, an 
object, and perhaps a "nudge" for individual agency and action.38   
 
Positioning Twaweza in this regard does not fully capture, however, the organization's articulation of  
citizenship.   This is where the other two distinctions—and their synthesis—are useful.  Lister identifies 
citizenship as status and citizenship as active practice as two conceptions which, though sometimes seen as exclusive, 
many contemporary theorists of  citizenship have sought to link together.  As a status, citizenship is about the 
rights granted to individuals (or, in more rare cases, groups) by the state.  As an active practice, citizenship is 
about taking action to "fulfill the potential of  that status."39  If  "citizenship as status" can be linked to many 
discourses of  liberal thought, this is where Twaweza parts ways with this tradition.  For Twaweza, clearly, 
citizens are more (and, the organization believes, should be treated as more) than passive rights-bearing 
consumers of  government provision or donor aid.  As one Twaweza staff  person stated in a reflection on the 
nine villages tour, "It's hardly as if  the wananchi are sitting around waiting for us to do things for them."40  
When Twaweza invokes the word "citizen," it might mean rational calculating individual, but it also means active, 
innovative, participating individual.  Citizens are active agents of  their own lives, "resourceful, inventive and 
sometime ingenious."41  Just as livelihoods must be (and are) secured by creative action, so must rights be 
(and sometimes are) secured by acts of  participatory citizenship on the part of  "ordinary people."  
 
And what about the relationship between citizens and the state?  Eyben and Ladbury's distinction between 
vertical and horizontal notions of  citizenship may be helpful here.  Vertical citizenship is focused on the 
relationship between the citizen and the state, as in most discourses built on "rights" or "entitlements." 
Horizontal citizenship, on the other hand, is about the relationship between citizens and their communities, as in 
communitarian understandings that emphasize belonging, connection, and acts of  civic virtue.  In this latter 
form, "the concept of  citizenships [relates] to rights and responsibilities [that people have] as members of  
families and communities."42  For Twaweza, with its emphasis on government-provided basic services as the 
object of  citizen agency, citizenship tends to remain in the domain of  the vertical.  There are some key 
moments where the organization's literature acknowledges the sense in which peoples' agency extends beyond 
citizen-state (including local state) relations, but these tend either to be framed in reference to people and not 
citizens (as in "millions of  ordinary people are simply getting on with their lives")43 or (more rarely and subtly) 
                         
34 Twaweza.  "More Than a Thousand Miles." p.8.   
35 Twaweza.  "Theory of  Change and Approach." p.4.   
36 Twaweza.  "Unpacking the Theory of  Change." p.1.   
37 Twaweza.  "Theory of  Change and Approach." p.3.   
38 See Twaweza's hypothesis that "action is more likely if  citizens perceive others/peers taking action." (Twaweza.  
"Concept Note: Twaweza External Evaluation." July 26, 2010. p.4).   
39 Lister 1997, 41.   
40 Twaweza.  "More Than a Thousand Miles.: Reflections on a Field Trip In the Lake Zone, Tanzania, October 2009." 
Pre-Publication Draft.  p.10.   This use of  the term wananchi raises an interesting set of  questions for our 
investigation regarding the use of  language.  We understand the Swahili term wananchi to translate literally as "child of  
the land or country" and signify something roughly akin to "ordinary citizen" (Scotton 1965).  We also understand 
the term to have a long and specific political history in Tanzania, with connotations that are beyond the scope of  our 
research to tease out.  We are thus unable to engage Twaweza's use of  the term directly—sticking instead with 
analysis of  the English term "citizen"—and simply encourage Twaweza to examine their notion of  wananchi in light 
of  the analysis presented here in order to find potentially useful learning insights.   
41 Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.1.   
42 Eyben and Ladbury 2007, 9.   
43 Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.1.   
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in the context of  discussing how citizens connect with each other to ask powerful people for things.44  
 
With this examination of  Twaweza's current concepts of  "citizen" and "citizenship" in mind, we will now 
turn to a more substantial exploration of  key issues and questions that arise within various literatures 
engaging these concepts.   
 
1. Does Citizenship Have a Value System?  
 
While the term "citizen" might seem at first glance to be a neutral, descriptive term, a number of  scholars 
have argued that it carries with it an implicit system of  values.45  To speak of  citizens and citizenship is to 
invoke a long history of  defining what these words mean, whom they apply to, and what is expected or 
demanded of  those who come under their domain.  Beginning with Aristotle's definition of  a citizen as "he 
who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of  any state,"46 we can see that 
the concept of  citizenship is immediately bound up with issues of  identity (who gets to be a citizen? who 
decides?), power (who can take part? who is excluded?), and, commonly (though, as we have seen, not 
exclusively), a link to the state.  In this way, usages of  "citizen" and "citizenship" come packaged with  specific 
politics and values, often in the form of  rankings:  
 
The various normative judgments associated with the discourse of  citizenship all rest on 
a positive evaluation of  one particular way of  life, and a correspondingly negative 
evaluation of  the many ways of  life that depart, in one way or another, from its central 
organizing principles.47 
 
These "normative judgments" may include specific notions of  participation, decision-making, responsibility, 
entitlement, inclusion and exclusion, individuality and community, and forms of  social communication and 
organization.  Citizenship implies, for example, a very specific notion of  the state and of  structures of  
legitimate governance.  As Hyden identifies, citizenship discourses can sometimes imply that "there is only 
one way to good governance and it is by accepting the basic features of  a Western liberal democracy...  free 
and fair elections, respect for rule of  law, an independent judiciary, a well-functioning state machinery, and a 
vibrant civil society."48   Such discourses also assume a basic level of  trust between “citizens” and “the 
state”49 which, for significant groups in East Africa (youth in Kenya), may not exist.50 
 
Other crucial questions can be raised about the normative nature of  citizenship as well: To what extent does 
calling someone a "citizen" draw them into a certain set of  expectations about how they should or should not 
behave, what they are and are not responsible for, and what possibilities and limits should be placed on their 
exercise of  power and agency?51  Might the implicit judgments carried with some notions of  citizenship work 
                         
44 See for example, in "Theory of  Change and Approach," the statement that "citizen action in practice requires 
leadership and is made possible by organizing" (p3).  Here "organizing" is a vague stand-in for the complex 
constitution of  collective power—sustained by horizontal citizenship—that may be required to make substantial 
change.   
45 Hindess 2002; Eyben and Ladbury 2007. 
46 Quoted in Hindess 2002.    
47 Hindess 2002, 129.   
48  Hyden 2006, 18. 
49   Coleman 1999.  
50   A large scale post-election youth assessment carried out in Kenya last year found that a high proportion of  out-of-
school youth had very low trust or confidence in local or national government. See ‘Youth Assessment: We Matter’. 
UNICEF/Kenya ( 2010).  
51 These questions refer to the process that Althusser calls "interpellation" in which the call or designation of  a subject 
by a power-wielding authority brings that subject into being (so to speak) as a subject of  their designation (Althusser 
1971).  To call someone a "citizen" is not simply an act of  innocent naming; it is, rather, to call them into the domain 
of  citizenship with all of  the normative baggage that this domain entails.  Suddenly, a person becomes a citizen-
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to devalue forms of  action and agency that do not fit into its definitions of  respectable public participation?  
When, for example, might implicit definitions of  "civic virtue"52 associated with citizenship close doors to 
other important ways in which popular agency might be expressed?53  Or when, for example, might forms of  
horizontal citizenship be eclipsed by, or valued less than, forms of  vertical citizenship?54  Does such a 
dynamic work to reinforce racial, gender, and class divisions when questions of  power, capability, and access 
might influence who is (or is not) able to exercise vertical citizenship?  
 
Another set of  related concerns has been raised in regard to the relationship between discourses of  
citizenship and the politics of  neoliberal development policy.  At a time in which governments are facing 
continual pressure to conform to economic models dictated by international financial institutions—key 
players in what Hindess calls the "supra-national governmental regime55 -- some observers fear that 
discourses of  citizenship may become complicit in supporting the erosion of  state autonomy and 
responsibility.  As Fowler and Biekart write, "when interpreted and articulated by neo-liberal political elites, 
the term 'citizenship' effectively legitimizes the unburdening of  a government's duties towards its polity."56  
Furthermore, an emphasis on practices and public forums for citizenship and citizen participation, 
circumscribed within a representative framework offering little substantive citizen power, may also sometimes 
serve as a strategy to generate popular acceptance for externally-imposed policy.57  Might it be the case that 
democracy, enacted through the participation of  "good citizens" in "good governance" is "the most effective 
means of  ensuring that the people will 'own', or at least that they not actively resist, the package of  political 
and economic reforms which their governments are required to implement"?58 
 
These above concerns, among others, are important reasons why some advocates of  democratic development 
have turned to using other terms in discussions of  bottom-up social change.  Bullain, for example, 
distinguishes between "civic" and "citizen".  The "citizen" is a particular manifestation of  civic identity, one 
that is linked primarily to the nation state structure of  the Northern/Western world.59  The civic domain is 
broader, referring to "that identity which is connected to the political community and reflects the persons' 
place and role in it."60  This is not simply about relationships with the state61; "civic action also relates to the 
                                                                               
subject, subjected to a relationship with the state, with power, with responsibility, with a political community.  The 
issue is to notice the potential political and ideological effects of  such a naming.   
52 There is a hint of  this bias in Twaweza's literature: the statement, for example, that "ways in which citizens can 
engage government by contributing to progressive action and holding government to account will be encouraged; 
whereas organizations that employ an uninformed criticism approach or promote partisan political activity will be 
eschewed" ("Theory of  Change and Approach”, p5).  Who shall decide what, exactly, and "uninformed criticism 
approach" shall be?  
53 See, for example, Hossain's (2009) report on "rude accountability" which describes forms of  popular action aimed at 
holding service delivery agents accountable for improving access and provision.  These actions "work through shame 
and embarrassment, pressures to maintain reputation and status, and the threat of  violence" (3)—dimensions of  
agency that may not be validated in many frameworks of  "citizenship" yet may be, nonetheless, important and 
sometimes effective forms of  social change.   
54 "Formal governance tends to have restrictive notions of  the public sphere that neglects the desires and effects of  the 
impoverished to create culture, sociality, and solidarity" (Hecht & Simone 1994, 16).   
55 Hindess 2002, 137.   
56  Fowler and Biekart 2008, 4. 
57  An illustrative case of  the problem of  development rhetoric on state-citizen participation, which bears little 
relationship to authentic participation, is the PRSP process in Tanzania. See Braethen (2006).  
58  Hindess 2005, 137.   
59 This is another important concern related to this critique of  citizenship's values: to what extent are concepts of  
citizenship sometimes complicit in importing or reinforcing Western/Northern (neo)colonial values and political 
structures while eclipsing or undermining value structures that are more indigenous to East Africa? (Nyamnjoh 
2004). 
60 Bullain 2008, 2.   
61   For example, civic engagement with religion in East Africa, be it church, mosque, or temple, is a powerful alternative 
modality to engagement with the state. 
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political community the persons see themselves as belonging to, which may not be the nation state."62  Hence 
"civic-driven change" seeks in some sense to side-step normative issues of  citizenship by placing agency in a 
broader domain and discourse of  the political.63  
 
2. Dimensions and Conundrums of  Citizenship: Further Considerations 
 
The normative nature of  discourses of  citizenship has been further unpacked by critical political theorists and 
development scholars along a number of  lines.  We offer here some brief  summaries of  key questions and 
issues that may be of  relevance to Twaweza's work:  
 
• Where Does Citizenship Come From?  One key question in scholarship about citizenship is that 
of  its origins and legitimation.  Who grants or generates citizenship?  As a "status," liberal thought 
would ascribe the power to grant citizenship to the nation-state.  Yet this status is not, for many 
people and communities, automatic.  Rather, citizenship for those who have been excluded from the 
status of  "rights-bearing individuals" is often a product of  political struggle.  This recognition has led 
some theorists to reformulate citizenship as a political identity apart from—and sometimes even 
existing in opposition to—the state; citizenship, in this frame, can be understood as a practice of  
agency that constitutes and secures its rights through collective action.64  As Phillips states, 
"citizenship must be an active condition of  struggling to make rights real."65  Hence a concern with 
utilizing a conception of  citizenship that appears to tie citizen agency and rights to a system of  state-
granted entitlements (as Twaweza may sometimes do in its emphasis on basic services) is that this 
discourse could function to reinforce a sense that ultimate power and legitimacy lies in the state 
rather than in the democratic struggles of  people—in citizen agency.   
 
• Is Citizenship About Individuals?  We have seen that Twaweza's conception of  citizenship 
appears to focus on the individual, on "the citizen."  Important questions have been raised, however, 
in regard to the effects of  such a perspective.  First, we have the issue of  cultural conceptions of  
collective and community-based agency being erased or delegitimated by individualistic approached 
to citizenship.  As Nyamnjoh points out, "in Africa the history of  contact with Western ideas of  
modernity is marked by a crusade to substitute cultures that emphasized interdependence between 
the individual and his/her community with neoliberal notions of  individual autonomy."66  Second is 
the issue of  individual citizenship being both impractical and ineffective in a context in which people 
lack access to resources and political power: "a critical look beneath the rhetoric of  rights appears to 
point to the fact that being an individual in the liberal democratic sense of  the word is both a process 
and a luxury that few can afford in reality."67  We will explore some of  these issues further in the 
section on agency below.   
 
• Who's In, Who's Out? Citizenship as Exclusion.  As Fowler and Biekart have pointed out, 
"citizenship is far from a universal identity shared by all people."68   Indeed, from its very origins the 
concept of  citizenship has referred specifically to some people and not others.  Contemporary notions 
and practices of  citizenship exclude a number of  groups from the sphere of  civic legitimacy: 
                         
62 Bullain 2008, 2.   
63 This is not to suggest that the concept of  "civic" does not itself  come with baggage.  Indeed, there are substantial 
discussion within the literature on civic-driven change about ways in which "civic" carries normative weight (See, for 
example, Dagnino 2008 and Fowler and Biekhart 2008b).   
64 Nyamu-Musembi 2002; Jones and Gaventa 2002; Mamdani 1990. 
65 Phillips 1991, quoted in Nyamu-Musembi 2002, 17.   
66 Nyamnjoh 2004, 35.   
67 Nyamnjoh 2004, 34.   
68 Fowler and Biekart 2008, 8.   
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migrants and refugees (who make up a significant portion of  East Africa's population)69 who do not 
have formal citizenship recognition in their countries of  residence; those excluded from full 
citizenship rights by law (e.g., gays & lesbians in many countries, blacks under apartheid, women in 
some countries); those whose culture & capabilities don't match those "required" of  a citizen , either 
by law or by social expectation (this includes political, media, and alphabetic literacy; mobility and 
communicative capability; and knowledge of  citizenship as a notion)70; and finally, those who cannot 
or do not meet the "obligations" of  being a citizen, and therefore are excluded from its "rights" 
(those unable to pay taxes, those accused of  crimes, etc.).  Given such exclusions, how can a strategy 
of  social change built on a discourse of  citizenship avoid generating an exclusionary politics?71  
 
Having addressed the "citizen" half  of  "citizen agency," we turn now to the second half.  When Twaweza 
seeks to enhance citizen agency, what is it, exactly, that the organization seeks to enhance?  What is agency for 
Twaweza?  How does this relate with ways in which agency has been conceptualized in scholarly literature 
about the subject?  What are some insights and questions that can be gleaned from this literature to inform, 
strengthen, and transform Twaweza's work?  
 
B. AGENCY  
 
As we have noted, Twaweza's conceptualization of  "citizen" and "citizenship" are more implicit than overt in 
the organization's literature.  Hence, when Twaweza speaks of  "citizen agency" it is most often foregrounding 
a conception of  agency while the question of  "who acts" is left somewhat in the background.  Agency, for 
Twaweza, is defined in at least two somewhat distinct yet overlapping ways.  First, and most commonly, 
agency is framed in terms of  access to, generation and use of, and communication of  information.  In this 
sense, agency is seen as the ability of  agents to "turn information into knowledge for making meaning...to 
monitor their situations...to express themselves in private and public spheres and...to initiate and co-cordinate 
actions to make a difference."72  Twaweza elaborates this view through the identification of  four dimensions 
of  agency all of  which are "related to the idea of  'uptake' of  information":73 
 
• Coming to know/understand refers to peoples' work of  "making meaning" out of  the information 
to which they have access.   
 
• Being able to monitor is about the ability to know government policies and commitments, track 
government activities, compare one's situation with that of  others, compare present and past, and to 
share these comparisons with others. 
 
• Expressing/voicing/communication refers to "the ability to participate in decision-making, 
                         
69 According to Human Rights First, nearly a third of  Africa's three million refugees are hosted by Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania.  Source: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/intl_refugees/regions/africa/east_africa.htm 
70 "In America, as elsewhere, the citizenship and consumer sovereignty, promised to all, can in reality be afforded only 
to the degree and by those who manage to harness the limited economic, cultural and social opportunities that 
translate into reality legal and political rights or abstract ideas of  the autonomous individual" (Nyamnjoh 2004, 34).   
71 A final dimension to the exclusionary danger of  citizenship is the bigger picture of  its function on a global scale.  As 
Hindess observes, "perhaps the most disturbing effect of...the division of  humanity into the populations of  
particular states...is that each state is expected to look after its own citizens and to be correspondingly less concerned 
about the condition of  those who appear to belong elsewhere" (2002, 130).  Might a discourse of  citizenship, then 
(rather than, for example, people), feed an international structure of  identity that undermines the possibility of  
solidarity and mutual responsibility?  
72 Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.2.  Earlier on the same page, this is expressed in a similar way, 
in which citizen agency is understood as "the ability of  men, women and young people to get better information 
more quickly, cheaply and reliably; monitor and discuss what's going on; speak out; and act to make a difference." 
73 Twaweza.  ""Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.5.   
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through having the communicative and discursive resources to make oneself  understood."  
 
• Taking action/making a difference is about "co-coordinating a sequence of  actions using various 
tools and resources...to achieve a particular purpose which involves a change from the current 
situation."  
 
The final dimension of  this four-fold conception forms the core of  Twaweza's second notion of  agency, one 
that is much broader and does not necessarily hinge on information as a central focus.  Here, Twaweza "sees 
agency as about people's ability to bring about change themselves, through individual and collective 
actions."74 This conception, less prominent yet powerful nonetheless, plays out throughout Twaweza's 
literature as a force that continually pushes the focus on access to information and the improvement of  basic 
services to its limits.  This is the conception of  agency that requires Twaweza to add to its list of  foci, along 
with "basic education, health care [and] clean water" the broad possibility that people will want to work on 
"other areas that might be meaningful to them."75  
 
This does, indeed, present a kind of  tension within Twaweza's work.  While on one hand the organization 
asserts that "our approach is to trigger agency, and we do not have targets for what we trigger,"76 it is also the 
case that the first (and more prominent) definition of  agency—along with a clear targeted focus on the areas 
of  education, health and water—are specific enough to raise questions that they might, in fact, be "targets."  
It is this tension, along with the overall importance of  enabling a further elaboration of  Twaweza's concepts 
of  agency, that calls for an examination of  the concept in more depth.   
 
1. What Is Agency?  
 
In its simplest sense, agency has often been defined as something akin to "the ability of  people to make 
choices."  In neoclassical economics, this definition has been elaborated as the "individual rational calculating 
agent"77 and has had profound influence on theories of  social change, development, and the constitution of  
livelihoods.78  It is a version of  this conception of  agency that appears to be at work in Twaweza's 
"Unpacking the Theory of  Change" document.  Here, we have a "citizen that makes a rational decision on 
how to allocate her time." The calculations made by this citizen are presented as individual processes—
perhaps influenced by "peer pressure or the ability to collaborate with others"—but ultimately about 
individual choice nonetheless.79 
 
The notion of  agency as a property or action of  the rational calculating agent has led to a strong distinction 
between agency and structure throughout the scholarly literature.  If  agency is the freedom of  individual 
actors to make choices, then structure is the institutional and social context that constrains and limits these 
choices.80  In this binary framework, a heated debate arises "about whether change is brought about or 
constrained by forces beyond peoples' control (social structures such as class, religion) or through individual 
and collective action (agency)."81  While the distinction may be useful in teasing out various forces and issues 
                         
74 This is the conception that is reflected also in Twaweza's assertion that "ordinary citizens can become drivers of  their 
own development and act as co-creators of  democracy" ("Theory of  Change and Approach," p.1).   
75 Twaweza.  ""Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.2.   
76 Twaweza. "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.7.   
77 See, for example, Becker 1981.   
78 Boettke 1998.   
79 Twaweza.  "Unpacking the Theory of  Change." p1.  This rational calculating agent is quite different, however, from 
some of  the notions of  agency suggested in Twaweza's "More Than a Thousand Miles Report." Here, we find a 
sense that individuals are embedded in social and relational contexts and that their actions and choices are both 
constrained and enabled by "the bonds that tie people together." (Twaweza.  "More Than a Thousand Miles.: 
Reflections on a Field Trip In the Lake Zone, Tanzania, October 2009." Pre-Publication Draft.  p.10).   
80 Luttrell et al.  2009; Peris et al 2009.   
81 Lutrell et al.  2009, 9; Cleaver 2007, 226.   
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at work in thinking strategically about social change, freedom, and power, this either/or framework has been 
identified by some as a hindrance to meaningful analysis and understanding.  On one hand, theories that 
focus on "agency as decision-making" tend to sidestep or underplay the importance of  the equity and power 
issues that affect people's abilities to make choices in the first place.82  These theories may sometimes also 
advocate for an overly-optimistic notion of  the transformative effects of  the exercise of  individual agency.83  
On the other hand, theories that focus on structural determinants and constraints tend to place power 
beyond the reach of  ordinary people and risk diminishing a sense that substantive change is possible without 
total revolution.84  
 
In response to this conundrum, many contemporary theorists of  agency have sought to develop conceptions 
that allow for a non-dualistic understanding of  how human action—at both individual and collective levels—
is shaped and influenced by a broad range of  factors including choice, freedom, power, institutional structure, 
culture, social location, habit, and affect/emotion, among others.  Albert Bandura's social cognitive theories 
of  agency and Amartya Sen's "capabilities approach" are two prominent examples of  such projects.  Bandura 
suggests that human agency operates within a system of  "triadic reciprocal causation" in which human 
behavior, cognitive and emotional factors, and external events in the environment "all operate as interacting 
determinants that influence one another bidirectionally."85  In this approach, it is understood that agency and 
structure are interrelated; that "people are producers as well as products of  social systems."86  For Sen, agency 
is conceptualized as one component of  a broader set of  considerations called "capabilities" and questions of  
the relationship between structure and agency are addressed within the context of  an analysis of  "what 
people are effectively able to do and to be."87  
 
The capability approach maintains what might be thought of  as a "traditional" focus on agency as a process 
of  conscious choice.88  For Sen, agency is "what a person is free to do and achieve in pursuit of  whatever 
goals or values he or she regards as important."89  Values and goals, and the choice to pursue them, are 
central to this conception: "agency is an actor's or group's ability to make purposeful choices"90 and "agency 
cannot be defined except in relation to goals."91  What sets this approach apart from earlier concepts of  the 
individual calculating agent, however, is that this goal-seeking agency is not understood in isolation.  Agency 
is one interdependent component, rather, of  a much broader framework.  The term "capabilities" is intended 
to capture some of  this multidimensionality, describing not only what people choose based on a set of  goals 
(agency), but also how these choices are affected by their access to individual and collective resources (which 
broadly include things such as well-being, community, a sense of  self-efficacy, information and knowledge, 
material resources, and more).92  
 
Beyond this deeply contextualized approach, two important implications of  Sen's conception of  agency as 
the freedom to pursue goals are that, first, these goals can be defined only by agents themselves (Sen has 
                         
82 As Cleaver (2007, 226) writes, "agency...does not exist in a vacuum but is exercised in a social world in which 
structure shapes the opportunities and resources available to individuals, in which appropriate ways of  being and 
behaving are not simply a matter of  individual choice." 
83 Cleaver notes that Giddens (1984) and Long (2001) are particularly good examples of  such a "largely optimistic" 
approach (Cleaver 2007, 226).   
84 Gibson-Graham 2006.   
85 Bandura 1999, 23. 
86 Bandura 1999, 24. 
87 Robeyns 2005, 94. See also Bronfenbrenner 1979.   
88 As Robeyns points out, Sen's framework is "clearly a theory within the liberal school of  thought in political 
philosophy, albeit arguably of  a critical strand" (2005, 95).   
89 Sen 1985, 206. 
90 Samman and Santos 2009, 3. 
91 Alkire 2008, 459. 
92 Robeyns 2005; Kabeer 1999; Crocker 2008 
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vehemently resisted the development of  a standard "list" of  capability goals93), and second, these goals need 
not be centered upon the well-being of  the individual agents.  The capability approach, notes Clark, has a 
notion of  agency which "recognizes that individuals often have values and goals...that transcend and 
sometimes even conflict with personal well-being."94  This is directly relevant to Twaweza's challenge, 
identified above, of  sorting through the tension between, on one hand, a notion of  agency that contains 
specific means (information access and use) and aims (improving basic services) and, on the other, a more 
Sen-like notion that remains fundamentally open to the exercise of  freedom that people with true agency will 
engage in.   
 
The capability approach, for all of  its merits, does not exhaust the field of  thought in the realm of  agency.  
Indeed, a number of  scholars have elaborated on important perspectives and dimensions of  the concept that 
are often missing from much of  the capability literature, particularly due to its extensive (and perhaps 
excessive) focus on human rationality and its operations in human goal-oriented choice.  There are at least 
three key issues raised in this regard.  First, as Cleaver points out, "agency is not simply comprised of  
reflexive action, but strongly constituted through non-reflexive practice."95  Agents choose, but their choices 
are affected by non-rational and often unconscious patterns, tendencies and dispositions—what Bordieu calls 
"habitus."96  
 
Second, the domain of  choice available to agents is importantly shaped by what might be called "the social 
production of  desire"—that is, the processes by which agents come to want (and to believe that they should 
want) certain things and not others.97  In a broad sense, considering this dimension of  agency means 
recognizing various forms of  social power at work—often more subtle than an analysis of  structures and 
institutions would allow us to acknowledge—that form the very conditions of  possibility for agency.  
Kabeer's study on the measurement of  women's empowerment makes this dimension explicit: in cases where 
women appear to have social choices that are likely to increase their well-being, yet choose otherwise, a notion 
of  agency needs to take into account ways in which these women have "internalized their social status as 
persons of  lesser value."98  Agency, in other words, cannot simply be reduced to choices that are constrained 
or enabled by various conditions and contexts.  Questions must also be asked about the processes and 
relationship which give rise to certain sets of  choices (and not others) in the first place.  We will return to this 
issue below in the discussion of  goals and achievements.   
 
A final and related dimension to agency is the question of  the formation of  agents themselves.  We touched 
upon this issue in our earlier discussion of  citizenship, yet it is worth re-stating in this context as well.  The 
rational (and non-rational) choices of  agents are made possible not only by the conditions in which they find 
themselves, but also by the social processes which generate the agents themselves as agents.  Agrawal prefers to 
use the term "subjects" over the term "agents" precisely for this reason.  Following Foucault, he understands 
that agents do not come into the world pre-formed, like atoms ready to assemble with other agents; rather, 
agents are shaped by—subjected to and therefore "subjects of"—social processes that make them (even as 
they themselves participate in this making through active choices and resistances).99  Just as certain forms of  
society-state relationships seem to generate "the citizen" as a particular subject, so does the social and cultural 
context in which people find themselves shape their subjectivity as "agents."  The individualized rational 
                         
93 Robeyns 2005, 106.   
94 Clark 2006.  See also Crocker 2008, 5.   
95 Cleaver 2007, 226. 
96 Bordieu 1977.  See also Greener (2002) for in-depth discussion of  non-reflexive dimensions of  agency.   
97 For an elaboration of  this notion in another domain—that of  the "history of  sexuality"—see Foucault 1978.   
98 Note that, while extremely useful, this notion of  "internalized oppression" can also be quite dangerous when an 
observer claims to know the extent to which another person has fallen under a spell of  "false consciousness." The 
conceit of  the observer is critical to be aware of  here; to what extent might women in Kabeer's case sometimes be 
quite aware of  the dynamics of  power involved, yet make choices nonetheless—for many reasons—that appear to be 
based on an internalization of  "lesser status"?  
99 Agrawal 2005.   
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choice model of  agency is, for example, a very culturally specific notion and is produced through various 
means—including (but far from limited to) academic and development practitioner discourses about "what 
agency is."100  
 
It is instructive here to look at Nyamnjoh's notion of  "domesticated agency," developed through a study of  
notions and practices of  personhood in Botswana.101  In contrast to Western liberal notions of  agents as 
autonomous individuals, Naymnjoh argues that traditionally throughout Bostwana (and, he also contends, 
Africa as a whole), "agency...has meaning only as domesticated agency, by which is meant agency that stresses 
negotiation, interconnectedness and harmony between individual interests and community expectations."102  
The individual does not realize freedom through expressions of  autonomy and independence, but rather in 
and through expressions of  interconnection with others.  "Achievement is devoid of  meaning if  not pursued 
within, as part of, and on behalf  of  a group of  people who recognize the achievement."103  The point here is 
not to substantiate a claim that such a notion of  agency is pervasive across all corners of  the African 
continent.  It is, rather, to offer an example of  a conception of  agency (which very well may be found in many 
parts of  East Africa as well) that differs substantially in its cultural content from that of  the Western norm.  
Such an example requires us to raise the question, when engaging with the cultivation of  citizen agency, of  
what kind of  culturally-specific conceptions of  subjectivity and personhood are being advocated?  Is 
something very particular disguised by a discourse that appears to be universal?  
 
Concluding our general discussion we can see that a number of  key lessons emerge from an engagement with 
the complexity of  contemporary thinking on agency.  These include notions that:  
 
• agency and structure are inseparable 
 
• agency is always contextual and relational 
 
• agency is multidimensional 
 
• agency is partly about choice, but it also involves non-reflexive dimensions 
 
• agency is shaped by, and exercised in the context of, complex power relationships and processes of  
social formation, including the formation of  desire and subjects. 
 
It is beyond the scope of  this project to offer a thorough evaluation of  the many perspectives on agency 
found in the scholarly literature or to develop an elaborate synthesis of  these perspectives.  In the elaboration 
that follows, we will explore some elements of  these perspectives that we believe can be useful to Twaweza's 
self-reflection and learning process, focusing in particular on an explication of  the numerous dimensions of  
agency identified in the literature, the constraints and enabling conditions that agents may face, and issues of  
the effectiveness of  agency in making change.   
 
 
                         
100 Morris et al.  2001.   
101 Nyamnjoh 2004.   
102 Nyamnjoh 2004, 38.   
103   Nyamnjoh 2004, 39.  It is important to note here Nyamnjoh's qualification (and defense) of  this conceptualization: 
"This worldview may be contested, but it is widely shared, and deserves to be taken seriously in scholarly analyses, 
without necessarily implying submission to an unproblematic, romantic or timeless notion of  a consensual Africa 
pregnant with primordial possibilities and untested communalisms.  Instead of  giving it an opportunity (even if  only) 
to prove itself  (wrong), this worldview has tended to be caricatured, trivialized or dismissed offhand, with the 
implication that it is inherently incompatible with the promotion of  individual rights and democracy.  Yet the closer 
one looks, the further away from reality this assumption seems" (2004, 39).   
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2. The Many Dimensions of  Agency 
 
Agency cannot be understood generically.  Because it is about the exercise of  human freedom, its 
manifestations are as diverse and complex as such freedom allows.  Samman and Santos, in their review of  
concepts and indicators of  agency, identify a number of  dimensions in which agency can be understood and 
analyzed.  These distinctions, we believe, can be helpful to Twaweza in clarifying its domains of  work, the 
specific dimensions in which enhanced citizen agency is encouraged, and in examining how these dimensions 
might (or might not) connect with and mutually-support each other.  As Alkire writes, "any one 'global' 
measure of  agency will obscure the informative variations."104  The dimensions of  these variations are:  
 
• Spheres.  These are "societal structures in which people are embedded, which can give rise to, shape 
and or constrain the exercise of  agency"105 and include such areas as states (local and national 
governments), markets (in many forms), households, communities, religious organizations, tribes, and 
families.  Agency formed in relation to and exercised in the context of  these spheres may look very 
different in each, and the expression or realization of  agency across spheres may depend on 
numerous factors including (but not limited to) access to knowledge and communication resources; a 
sense of  rights and of  self-efficacy; access to the social resources necessary to cross spheres or to 
various mediating power-brokers who can cross these spheres as proxies; and the ability to allocate 
time and existing resources to such purposes.106  
 
• Domains.  These refer to the kinds of  tasks to which agency is applied,107 including such things as 
obtaining goods and services, sustaining health or addressing illness, pursuing education, 
communicating with others, advocating for improved services or government accountability, building 
community, resolving (or generating) disputes, cultivating friendships, managing daily family 
relationships, courting potential mates, and raising children.  As should be clear, domains are not 
restricted to any particular sphere; rather, they are cross-cutting practical activities that may involve 
numerous different forms of  engagement across multiple spheres.108  As with the dimension of  
spheres, however, it is not clear that the exercise of  agency in one domain translates to agency across 
others: "even though an advance in agency in one dimension may enhance agency in others, this is 
not always the case."109 
 
• Forms.  In multiple spheres and across multiple domains, agency can also take a number of  different 
forms.  Bandura distinguishes three110: direct personal agency is individual agency manifest as action by 
that individual.  This is often the form of  agency that is assumed in various rational choice models.  
Proxy agency is quite different: "in this socially mediated mode of  agency, people try to get those who 
wield influence and power to act on their behalf  to get what they want."111  Collective action is a form 
of  agency in which people are acting together to seek collectively-desired (or at least collectively 
                         
104  Alkire 2009, 465.   
105  Samman and Santos 2009, 6. 
106 As Samman and Santos summarize, "there may be cultural, spiritual, political dimensions to the question of  why 
one would exercise 'agency' in one sphere and not the other" (2009, 6).   
107 "Agency and empowerment can be described and measured with respect to different domains of  life...[it is] 
experienced with respect to different tasks" (Ibrahim and Alkire 2007, 5) 
108 Obtaining clean water, for example, may involve negotiating spheres of  government service provision, community 
resource use policies and practices, market relations (in the case of  privatized water systems), and household 
divisions of  labor.   
109 Samman and Santos offer an example here: "a woman may be very empowered as a mother but excluded from the 
labor force by social conventions" (2009, 7).  They go on to note that empirical evidence supports the view that 
"different aspects of  women's reported empowerment...tend to be poorly correlated" (7).   
110   Bandura 1999.   
111   Bandura 1999, 34.   
Miller, Hartwell & Rossman, Unpacking Twaweza’s Theory of  Social Change                                   page 18 
 
constituted) outcomes.112  These forms are substantively different, involving very different kinds of  
actors, relating in very different ways, and involving distinct relations of  power and influence.  Work 
to trigger these various forms of  agency—Twaweza’s goal—would need to be crafted very differently 
depending on the form.   
 
• Levels (or scales).  These refer to the geographical and scalar dimensions of  agency.  Here we see 
that agency can be enacted on scales from the local to the (ostensibly) global,113 or from the "micro" 
to the "macro."114  This is a dimension with which Twaweza seems particularly concerned, raising 
questions in its literature about "the role of  proximity vs. distance in the exercise of  agency" and "the 
kinds of  communicative resources needed for less proximal agency to be exercised."115  Samman and 
Santos claim, in this regard, that "the set of  skills required for the exercise of  agency at each level 
seems to be somehow different, though some skills may be transferable."116  
 
• Modes of  Power.  This, the final dimension we will discuss, refers to the ways in which the power 
wielded by agents to accomplish their goals is used, or rather, the forms that the power relationships 
of  agency take.  Numerous authors have adopted and adapted Rowland's framework117 for 
conceptualizing these modes as the exercise of  power over ("the ability to coerce and influence...actions 
and thoughts"118), power to ("the capacity to act, to organizing and to change,"119 to "create new 
possibilities"120), power with ("power from collective action"121), and power from within ("enhancing self-
respect and self-acceptance"122).  As with the other dimensions, each of  these modes of  power 
carries along with it important contingencies and consequences.  Agency will not work through all of  
these modes in every sphere and domain, in every form, or on every level.  Agents may be 
constrained in their use of  some modes and enabled in their use of  others, and these conditions will 
greatly influence how agency can be "triggered" and, when it is, what that can and will look like.   
 
In general, it is clear that researchers are skeptical of  any generalized claims that the exercise of  agency in one 
sphere, domain, form, level or mode of  power can be read as an indicator that agency can or will be exercised 
in another dimension.  Because each dimension is shot through with difference, signifying profound divides 
and disjunctions between different realms of  "everyday life," the "assumption that as a person becomes more 
empowered to act in one [dimension] this will feed over into another" is problematic.  As Alkire contends, 
"scrutiny of  the evidence has called into question such general assumptions."123  It does not appear that 
                         
112 Though collective action does present a substantial challenge to the notion of  "goal-seeking," since it is not always 
clear that a given collective action instance can be said to involve a true consensus among actors.  Indeed, the most 
extreme instance of  collective agency as a form of  non-rational, non-choice is--in some cases, at least--the mob 
action or the mass riot.   
113 We must be careful in our use of  the notion of  "global scale," since it can be quite illusory.  As Gibson-Graham 
(2002, 32) has pointed out, all action at the "global" level takes place in some specific local place.  In this sense, the 
global is not a "scale" as much as it is a particular way of  articulating local actions together—often via multi-local 
institutions with access to vast resources—to generate forms of  influence (agency) that extend across numerous 
localities and (in many cases) through numerous spheres.   
114   Samman and Santos 2009, 6. 
115  Twaweza.  "Concept Note: Twaweza External Evaluation." July 26, 2010.  p.4 
116 Samman and Santos 2009, 8.  "At the individual level people may need to be self-confident, self-determined, to 
know what they want, and to direct their actions towards that goal.  At a collective level, individuals must surmount 
the collective action problem, attain consensus, and take on a role either as a leader or follower" (8).   
117  Rowland 1997.   
118  Luttrell et al 2009, 9.   
119  Luttrell et al 2009, 9.   
120  Samman and Santos 2009, 8.   
121  Luttrell et al 2009, 9. 
122  Samman and Santos 2009, 8.   
123  Alkire 2009, 466.   
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research on this topic has advanced sufficiently to offer a global analysis of  which dimensions are likely to 
link to or "spill over" into others in terms of  the exercise of  agency; indeed, such an analysis may be 
impossible outside of  the specific details of  an on-the-ground case.  This evaluation work must be done, we 
conclude, "in the field," in direct conversation with—and perhaps through experimentation in collaboration 
with—people who are exercising agency in various forms.   
 
Figure 4. An illustration of  agency’s many dimensions. 
 
 
3. Making Agency Work: Constraints and Enabling Factors  
 
Having outlined some of  the complex dimensions of  agency, we turn now to exploring some of  the key ways 
in which the expression and exercise of  agency is constrained and enabled.  This is crucial, for no effort to 
enhance citizen agency can succeed if  it does not take careful notice of  these elements.  We identify five 
categories of  factors within the literature: assets (resources), capabilities (knowledge and power), 
affect/emotion, habit/routine, opportunity structure, and responsibility.  We shall examine each in turn.   
 
Assets, or resources, are perhaps the most obvious constraints or enabling factors in the exercise of  agency.  
Indeed, as Cleaver describes, "individuals effect action by deploying various sorts of  resources."124 Resources 
include material assets, but also "the various human and social resources which serve to enhance the ability to 
exercise choice."125 These resources may be individual assets, such as land, housing, livestock, knowledge, tools 
                         
124  Cleaver 2009, 131.   
125  Kabeer 1999, 437.   
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or financial wealth, or they may be collective assets that include shared material goods, common pool resources, 
collective confidence, and social resource such as "voice, organization, representation and identity."126 It is 
both the form and the distribution of  these resources--in the specific contexts which people are faced with--
that makes the difference.  In terms of  form, the resources to which people have access must match the 
requirements of  the sphere, domain, form and level at which they wish to act.  In terms of  distribution, people 
must have adequate access to these resources and inequity in such access is bound to significantly hinder or 
prevent the exercise of  agency.127  
 
Affect and emotion are equally as critical to the exercise of  agency and, while they can be considered a type 
of  resource, deserve separate treatment.  Here we refer to the senses or feelings that people have about 
themselves, their world, and the possibilities for effective action.  As Bandura describes, "unless people 
believe that they can produce desired effects by their actions they have little incentive to act or to persevere in 
the face of  difficulties.  Whatever other factors serve as motivators, they are rooted in the core belief  that one 
has the power to produce changes by one's actions."128  At least four key dimensions of  this sense of  power 
are identified in the literature.129   
 
• Sense of  right.  In order to act people must have a "sense of  the right to do so."130  This may be a 
sense of  right granted formally by the state, a sense of  right based on a community's shared values, 
or a sense of  internal moral right.   
 
• Sense of  capability.  Effective action requires people to have "a sense of  the capabilities to 
participate effectively." To be clear, this is a separate issue from that of  actual capabilities; one may 
have capability but be unable to activate it because of  a sense or feeling that this capability is lacking.  
Bandura notes the importance of  this dimension: "Among the mechanisms through which human 
agency is exercised, none is more central or pervasive than beliefs of  personal efficacy."131  This 
sense of  capacity, Cleaver points out, is significantly influenced by "wider macrosocial patterns of  
ethnicity, class and gender."132  
 
• Sense of  efficacy.  Here we are dealing not with a sense of  one's own internal capacities, but rather 
with a sense of  how effective this capacity might be in achieving a particular goal.  Agency is activated 
by a sense that what we seek to influence can, in fact, be influenced.  Political agency is activated, 
similarly, by "a sense that such participation will have an impact upon political processes."133  Beliefs 
about how change happens and the responsiveness of  institutions to citizen action are key factors.   
 
• Sense of  possibility.  This affective dimension is importantly distinct from a sense of  efficacy.  If  
an agent does not feel that a given action, transformation, or goal is possible, then a senses of  right,  
capability or of  efficacy may be rendered moot.  In this dimension, we confront the effects of  what 
Gaventa calls "invisible power": the myriad ways in which the exercise of  power can "shape the 
psychological and ideological boundaries of  participation" by determining what appears appropriate 
to discuss, imagine, act upon, or articulate.134  
 
                         
126  Samman and Santos 2009, 3.   
127  Cleaver 2009.   
128  Bandura 1999, 28. 
129  Note that these dimensions form a hierarchy by which “sense of  efficacy” requires the “sense of  right and 
capability” and the sense of  possibility depends on the three prior “senses.” 
130  Jones and Gaventa 2002, 23, citing Seidman 1999 and Lister 1997.   
131  Bandura 1999, 28.   
132  Cleaver 2009, 137.   
133  Jones and Gaventa 2002, 23.   
134  Gaventa 2006.   
Miller, Hartwell & Rossman, Unpacking Twaweza’s Theory of  Social Change                                   page 21 
 
Habit and routine are dimensions of  daily practice that are not often discussed in development literature 
dealing with issues of  agency.  However, as Cleaver points out, "there has been an overemphasis on the role 
of  reflexive action and deliberative strategizing in people's agency, and a relative neglect of  the impact of  
routinized practices and unconscious motivations."135  On one hand, this factor in the realization of  agency is 
about the simple and mundane ways in which daily actions become ingrained, habitualized and thus difficult 
to engage as locations of  potential conscious and transformative action.  On the other hand, this habitual 
momentum is bound up with the operations of  power.  As Greener writes:  
 
Agents, through structural, habitual or informational constraints, may be severely restricted 
in their range of  possible actions, but be unaware of  this as their actions have become so 
ingrained in practice that they are considered normal, and a lack of  opportunity is not only 
the most likely outcome, but also the 'common sense' one.136  
 
This is a factor that Twaweza may want to consider thoroughly, since the transformation of  information (as 
we shall discuss in the following section) into meaningful and potentially activating knowledge may be 
profoundly influenced (specifically, limited or closed off) by these processes of  habit and routine.   
 
Opportunity structure is a term used by Ibrahim and Alkire, Samman and Santos and others to refer to the 
broad array of  social, political and economic contexts that shape the opportunities agents have to make 
choices, act and to have those actions make a difference.137  Resources, positive emotion and a rupture in 
habit are often not enough: "even when individuals have a pro-active attitude, they may be constrained by the 
institutional environment in which they operate in such a way that they may not be able to transform their 
choices into the desired outcomes."138  Opportunity structure can be understood in terms of  four broad (and 
significantly overlapping) categories:  
 
• Identity factors.  In contexts in which human identities are linked to social hierarchies that mediate 
peoples' access to resources and power, identity factors are crucial in constraining or enabling 
(depending on one's identity and the context in which one seeks to act) agency.  As Cleaver writes, 
"inequitable social relations ensure that some individuals, by virtue of  their class, gender, ethnicity, 
and so on, are better placed than others to deploy resources, to shape rules, and to exercise power 
and rights."139  It is this reality that makes generalizations about what may or may not enhance 
"citizen agency" nearly impossible.  As numerous researchers have shown, identities of  gender, race, 
class, ethnicity, age (etc) matter in shaping the spheres, domains, forms, and levels on which agency 
can be exercised by a given individual or group.140  Efforts to trigger "citizen agency" in general may, 
in this context, lead to triggering only the agency of  those people who already have increased access 
to resources and power via the privileges that certain identities (among other factors discussed in this 
section) incur.   
 
• Institutional factors.  Institutions (which include racism, sexism, and classism, among other 
“institutions”) crucially shape the contexts in which agency is exercised as well.141  A few distinctions 
                         
135  Cleaver 2009, 137.   
136  Greener 2002, 696.   
137  Ibrahim and Alkire 2007; Samman and Santos 2009; Naryan 2005. 
138  Samman and Santos 2009, 4. 
139  Cleaver 2009, 131.   
140  Kabeer 1999; Litrell et al.  2009.  Cleaver takes this analysis one step farther in asking critical questions about the 
use of  facile categories such as "women," "the poor" and "youth." These categories, as important as they may be 
for refining an even more generalized notion of  generic "agency," can themselves hide significant differences.  
"The question of  how such generalize categories of  people might exercise agency is generally sidestepped" 
(Cleaver 2001, 38).   
141 Samman and Santos describe this factor as such: "access to information, the degree of  inclusion and participation 
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are important.  First, we have both formal and informal institutions.  Formal institutions, such as 
governments, laws, contracts, and organizations are the overt public structures within which (and 
sometimes against which) people often engage when seeking to achieve certain kinds of  public goals 
in their exercise of  agency.  Informal institutions are more difficult to name and identify, though their 
operation is equally important in the shaping of  the conditions for agency.142  These include 
numerous relations and (often) tacit agreements about how people should behave, relate, reciprocate, 
and advocate for their needs in the context of  social networks and complex webs of  identity and 
power.   
 
On the formal side, another important distinction is between the structures of  institutional participation 
and response and institutional capacity.  Institutional participation and response names ways in which a 
given organization (government, NGO, church or mosque, community group) are structured to 
facilitate (or not) participation by those who are affected by their operations and the ways in which 
these institutions respond to the needs, aspirations and demands of  stakeholders.  Institutional capacity, 
on the other hand, is about the extent to which a given institution is actually capable of  addressing a 
given set of  needs or concerns--regardless of  its structures of  participation and response.  This is an 
important difference, since a key question in thinking about and advocating for citizen-driven change 
in contexts of  intense resource scarcity (such as rural East Africa) is whether citizen agency can—even 
if  it is able to move institutions to desire change—actually have impact.  Advocating for better schools, for 
example, may be hindered by a lack of  institutional accountability; but it may just as well be hindered 
by an inability of  the accountable institutions to actually solve the problem even if  they desire to do 
so.   
 
• Cultural factors.  "Because they are relational," write Samman and Santos, "agency and 
empowerment are highly cultural concepts, related to the system of  norms, values and beliefs of  a 
society."143  Some of  these dimensions were explored earlier in our discussion of  cultural notions of  
agency.  Here, however, we wish to highlight a few specific cultural elements that are important to 
consider in mapping the complexities of  agency.   
 
Social location, or "social placement," refers to the specific ways in which people are embedded in their 
cultural communities.  This includes the many relations of  expectation, reciprocity and responsibility 
that call for particular kinds of  behavior and action.144  As Cleaver writes, "the imperatives of  social 
location may cause people to choose not to exercise rights for fear of  damaging their social and 
livelihood networks."145  
 
Social perceptions are bound up in these networks, constituting ways in which people within a particular 
community view and understand (and thus influence the self-perception of) a particular member; 
thus, "an individual's ability to exercise agency in claiming rights is partly defined by others and their 
                                                                               
in economic life, the degree of  accountability of  the public sector and the capacity of  local organization" (2009, 3). 
142   Cleaver (2001, 40) points out that "there is a tendency in the development literature to recognize the importance of    
social and 'informal' institutions but nevertheless to concentrate on the analysis of  'formal' institutions." 
143   Samman and Santos 2009, 9.   
144 Challenging the individualism that is often implicit or explicit in social science approaches to understanding agency, 
Ballet et al.  suggest that we see "the person as embedded in a network of  social relationships that determine a set 
of  rights and obligations" (Ballet et al.  2007, 185).  They suggest, then, that a conception of  agency must take 
responsibility seriously: "a person is a subject whose substantive ‘richness’ includes major awareness of  personal 
responsible for his/her own actions, but also of  being aware ex-ante of  responsibility towards others and the 
community for the choices made.  This can even be at the expense of  her personal freedom.  In real life, especially 
in traditional societies, freedom often depends on first satisfying one’s own personal obligations towards others.  It 
is this capability of  first fulfilling one’s obligations that subsequently generates the capability of  choosing what one 
wants rather than vice versa" (187).   
145   Cleaver 2009, 128. 
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perception of  the individual as worthy of  citizenship."146  
 
Tradition and etiquette also plays an important role in the exercise of  agency.  Lange describes this in the 
Tanzanian context: "villagers claim that, although they may have voted their leaders into power, they 
find it extremely difficult to hold them to account.  One reason is local traditions and etiquette, which 
in many areas of  Tanzania keep lower status people from criticizing higher status people in public."147 
 
Finally, cosmology—cultural beliefs about the nature of  life and reality, including religious beliefs—is 
crucial: "cosmologies matter in the formation of  subjectivities and in the shaping of  the relationship 
between individuals, collective action, and social hierarchies."148  This includes, as Mwaura discusses 
in an article about the linkages between spirituality, faith and civic-driven change, religious beliefs 
which—in part—“determine civic arrangements within and between societies."149 
 
• Broader social and political contexts.  This is a kind of  catch-all category, but is mean to refer to 
the ways in which specific forms and instances of  agency are influenced by processes, dynamics and 
histories that exceed the immediate social, political and economic situations in which actors find 
themselves.  Structures of  global economic governance that shape national and local policy, dynamics 
of  economic growth and decline, technological development and dissemination, and ongoing 
manifestations of  the legacies of  colonialism are all examples of  such factors.  While often seemingly 
beyond the control of  individual or collective direct action, these processes must be taken into 
account in conceptualizing how, when, where, why and for what agency is exercised.  Placing strategic 
interventions in these broader contexts can serve to make visible potential tensions, challenges or 
possibilities.    
 
Mamdani's analysis of  the citizen-subject relationship in African politics is a case in point.150  His 
concern is that much contemporary work on democratization and development in African states fails 
to fully grapple with the ways in which late colonial forms of  governance and power have shaped—
and continue to shape—the politics of  citizen-state relations throughout the continent.  To develop 
successful strategies for democratization in contemporary African nations (particularly, but not 
exclusively in regions formerly under British rule), Mamdani argues, we must understand the 
particular political strategy of  colonial control known as "indirect rule," or what Mamdani calls 
"decentralized despotism,"and the many complex ways in which that strategy has influenced the 
contemporary political formation of  African governance structures.  To take Mamdani's analysis 
seriously requires that we acknowledge ways in which no amount of  citizen advocacy for improved 
provision of  services will lead to democratization without an accompanying strategy for both the 
democratic transformation of  the structures of  governance and of  the identities and subjectivities of  people 
themselves.  In the context of  Mamdani's analysis, we must ask how strategies of  improved information 
and communication, and, more generally, strategies of  increased civic participation will be articulated 
with strategies of  ongoing work to overcome the legacies of  the bifurcated state: strategies that link 
the rural and urban, the local and central, and develop political structures, cultures and spaces of  
democratic participation and representation at all levels of  governance.   
 
4. What Can Agents Succeed in Doing? The Question of  Goals and Achievements 
 
To speak only of  constraints and enabling factors for agency would avoid what is perhaps the stickiest issue in 
any effort to conceptualize or to actualize the power of  people and communities.  If  agency is significantly 
                         
146  Cleaver 2009, 137.   
147  Lange 2008, 1139.   
148  Cleaver 2009, 134.    
149  Mwaura 2008.   
150  Mamdani 1996.   
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about seeking to achieve a particular set of  visions and goals for the good life, then we must ask some 
challenging questions about how--and by whom--these aspirations are developed.  Given the complex 
configuration of  constraints faced by any particular group of  "ordinary citizens," what visions actually 
materialize as goals worth struggling for?  In her approach to agency, Kabeer "considers not just an 
individual's ability to choose to act, but how much power they have to make strategic decisions that shape 
their lives."151  She distinguishes, therefore, between first-order choices, "decisions fundamental to the shape of  a 
person's life," and second-order choices, "choices that affect life's quality but to not constitute its defining 
parameters."152  
 
It is also critical to ask questions about how agency is expressed in the pursuit of  goals.  Particularly a context 
in which people are constrained from making first-order choices, should we always expect agency to look like 
public advocacy, monitoring, action for accountability or the demand for improved service provision? To 
what extent do the constraints and conditions placed on agency by myriad factors discussed above lead not to 
struggle and transformation, but to an active choice—an exercise of  agency—to not engage in public 
advocacy?  As Cleaver outlines, "daily livelihood imperatives, unequal command of  resources, and placement 
within social networks of  emotional relations may push the exercise of  agency toward social harmony and 
conflict avoidance, rather than toward effective resistance or explicit renegotiation of  rights."153  We need, 
perhaps, to heed Cleaver's call to "think beyond the assumption that agency equates to empowering 
action."154  
 
As noted above, arguing for a conception of  citizenship that ties agency and rights to a system of  state-
granted entitlements may well suggest that the state is the ultimate power, rather than citizens as they seek to 
improve their daily lives. 
 
C. KEY QUESTIONS ON AGENCY 
 
¾ How will Twaweza navigate the tension of  the claim to support an unconstrained expression of  
citizen agency and, on the other hand, to support specific forms of  information, monitoring and 
accountability that focus on basic (public) services?   
 
¾ To what extent do Twaweza's assertions about the power of  citizen-driven change underestimate the 
real barriers faced by citizens to making meaningful transformation?  
 
¾ In Twaweza’s discourse about agency and citizenship, who is excluded?  Where is the espoused 
commitment to “the most marginalized”? 
 
¾ Does agency inhere in the individual?  Is it something individuals “possess”?  Or is it an energy that 
is expressed through collective action? 
 
¾ How will citizen agency be clearly defined and measured without careful stipulation of  what is meant 
by the concept? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
151  Kabeer 1999, cited in Cleaver 2009, 133. 
152  Kabeer 1999, cited in Cleaver 2009, 133. 
153  Cleaver 2009, 138.   
154  Cleaver 2009, 129.   
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IV. ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
 
A. ACCESS TO WHAT? DEFINING INFORMATION 
 
To begin an exploration of  concepts and practices of  accessing and generating information, we must begin 
by understanding the various ways in which Twaweza defines information itself  and how this definition is 
positioned in relationship to other understandings.  In the organization's earlier literature, the concept of  
information was left essentially undefined.  Used frequently as a central organizing concept, its definition(s) 
remained implicit, emerging more from examples given than from a direct discussion of  definition.  Thus, we 
see general reference to "making information public" (what is it that is being made public?), "translating and 
popularizing information" (what is it that will be popularized?), and "broad access to information" (broad 
access to what?) and specific reference to land ownership data, budgets, government policy, data sets, and 
research studies.155  Are we to conclude that Twaweza means, by "information," public data about financial 
and legal structures?  Or is it the case, instead, that Twaweza is focused specifically on information that 
contains content about "rights, responsibilities and entitlements"156?  If  this is so, then we may still be unclear 
on what exactly this "information" is.  Thus, the framing question for this section is: 
 
¾ What is meant by “information” in Twaweza’s theory of  social change and what  
theoretical notions might inform a working understanding of  this construct? 
 
In more recent literature, however, the notion of  information has been further elaborated.  While we are still 
unable to find a definition (content, information, and knowledge all appear to be used somewhat 
interchangeably), we do find more detail regarding Twaweza's understandings of  its nature.  It appears that 
information is not, for Twaweza, a single, unified thing; rather, it is important to distinguish between 
"different types of  information."157  These include:  
 
• Information about outcomes ("including comparisons").   
 
• Information "around processes (including information that triggers the imagination)"  
 
• Information "that raises peer pressure (shaming)" 
 
• Information "that enables coordination (everybody that is concerned about health should wear his 
hair in a pony tail)"158  
 
Our concern with these distinctions, particularly in light of  the literature which we shall subsequently review, 
is that while important and useful, they are not actually distinct "types" of  information; they are, rather, 
                         
155 To be fair, "traditional folklore" appears once in the literature, but in a strange context: opposed to content that 
would be disseminated through "traditional media," folklore is "typically held by public bodies and NGOs" 
(Twaweza.  "Theory of  Change and Approach." p.8.).   This is either an editing mistake, a loaded statement 
(implying that tradition in East Africa has effectively died and become the domain of  government agencies and 
museum-keepers), or a misnomer about the nature of  "traditional folklore."  Regardless, it is the only reference to 
such forms of  knowledge in Twaweza's literature and does not appear to play a central role in any of  the 
organization's expressed goals or work foci.  The example of  information in the "Asha and Juma" story seems 
more representative: "HakiElimu sent an envelope full of  information about the government education plan, what 
it was meant to achieve, the amount of  money that was to reach schools, and how everyone had a right to be 
involved through the local school committee." (Twaweza.  "Theory of  Change and Approach." p.4.). 
156   Twaweza.  Purpose, Goals and Objectives." p.3.   
157   Twaweza.  "Unpacking the Theory of  Change." p.2.   
158   All quotes in this bulleted section are from Twaweza.  "Unpacking the Theory of  Change." p.2. 
Miller, Hartwell & Rossman, Unpacking Twaweza’s Theory of  Social Change                                   page 26 
 
different subjects, goals, or effects which information (of  a number of  various types) might contribute to or 
address.  And this is not a trivial difference.159  When Twaweza asks evaluators to investigate "under what 
conditions/circumstances is there uptake of  information by citizens," clarity regarding the nature of  this 
"information" will be crucial.  What, exactly, are researchers looking for?  What, exactly, are citizens 
"uptaking" and which kinds of  uptake are Twaweza seeking to support?  It may be useful here to turn to an 
exploration of  some ways in which information is conceptualized by information science scholars and others.   
 
1. Concepts of  Information  
 
Defining "information" is, to say the least, quite challenging.  We can illustrate this challenge by beginning 
with Parker's definition of  information as "the pattern of  organization of  matter and energy."160  
From this viewpoint, the only thing in the universe that does not contain information is total entropy; that 
alone is pattern-free."161  Bates distinguishes, among others, two important and interrelated types of  
information within this vast (and potentially confusing) definition: "neural-cultural information," or 
information that is "encoded in the brain and nervous system,"162 and "exosomatic information," or 
"information stored externally to the body of  animals."163  Neural-cultural information includes:  
 
• Experienced information.  (Life experience that is embodied--literally--by being "encoded in neural 
pathways of  the brain") 
 
• Enacted information ("when an animal enacts information, it acts in the world, utilizing whatever 
capabilities and experience it can from its neural stores.") 
 
• Expressed information ("the pattern of  organization of  communicatory scents, calls, gestures, and 
ultimately, human spoken language used to communicate among members of  a species and between 
species")164 
 
Exosomatic information includes:  
 
• Embedded information ("that enduring information created or altered by the actions of  animals and 
people in the world") 
 
• Recorded information ("communicatory or memorial information preserved in a durable medium")165 
 
These categories can allow us to see both the complexities of  the concept of  information and also the myriad 
manifestations that information may take at any given time and in any given social process.  When speaking 
of  the "access to information," are we referring to peoples' access to certain experiences?  To embodied 
                         
159 As Menou (1995b) states, concepts of  information "relate to both processes and material states which are closely 
inter-related and may often come to play in any situation.  That they are inextricably interwoven is no excuse for 
not pursuing their differentiation and definition, even if  the latter are only tentative and temporary.  Remaining 
alert about what type of  information one is dealing with at any stage appears to be a basic requirement for effective 
reasoning." Agre also points out that "The problem with 'information' is that it levels the distinctions among 
disparate categories of  communicative actions and artifacts" (1995, 227).   
160 Parker 1974, quoted in Bates 2006, 1033.  Bates elaborates: "Information is the pattern of  organization of  the 
matter of  rocks, of  the earth, of  plants, of  animal bodies, or of  brain matter.  Information is also the pattern of  
organization of  the  energy of  my speech as it moves the air, or of  the earth as it moves in an earthquake" (Ibid).   
161   Bates 2006, 1033.   
162   Bates 2006, 1038. 
163   Bates 2006, 1039.   
164   All quotes in this bulleted list from Bates 2006, 1038-9. 
165   Bates 2006, 1039. 
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practices and the knowledge that they build and require?  To spaces for communication with each other (by 
many means, including speaking, dancing, singing, and writing)?  To experiences of  durable material 
constructions?  To concrete representations and recordings of  experience and knowledge (such as papers, 
data sets, pictures and charts)?  To a combination of  some (but not all) of  these?  
 
Shifting from this big-picture view, we can narrow our focus to look more specifically at ways of  categorizing 
information as it is (perhaps) more commonly understood: specifically, as a combination of  expressed and 
recorded information.  In this regard, McReadie and Rice's comprehensive literature review on cross-
disciplinary conceptions of  information is quite helpful.166  They distinguish four primary notions of  
information:  
 
Information as commodity/resource is perhaps the most common understanding of  information, 
particularly in mainstream political and media discourses.  In this conception, information is a thing, 
"something that can be produced, purchased, replicated, distributed, sold, traded, manipulated, passed along, 
controlled"167 and, we would add, taken-up or accessed.  Menou calls this conception "information-as-object."168  
It is this notion that we see most consistently in Twaweza's literature—a sense that information is a thing, or a 
bundle of  things, which people can create, access, transform, pass along, and then (hopefully) do things with.  
These things, most often, are understood to be bundles of  facts, objective statements about the nature of  
current economic, political, or social reality.  We will return to this notion of  "information as facts" further 
below.   
 
Information as data in the environment links us with some of  the broader conceptions of  neural-cultural 
and embedded (exosomatic) information presented above.  In this understanding, information is data that is 
"available for interaction with human information processing capabilities."169  This includes "objects, artifacts, 
sounds, smells, visual and tactile phenomena, activities, events of  the phenomena of  nature."170  Information 
here is the broad complex of  sensory data that people and communities pull into their worlds of  experience.  
This is, in a sense, a notion of  information that is consistent with "the domain of  everyday life."171  Not only 
does it validate a wide array of  ways in which people navigate their realities, but it also raises important 
questions about the kinds of  information that are and are not recognized as such.  Menou notes the tendency 
to "equate information with formal information products and services" and the ways in which such an 
equation can deny the legitimacy of  other crucial forms.172  He concludes, quite usefully, that "when formal 
information sources, especially information systems and services are not used, it does not mean that people 
live without information, but simply that they rely on other channels."173  
 
Information as a representation of  knowledge is a way of  thinking about information as a guide to, or a 
"pointer to" varieties of  knowledge.  Information, in this conception (or, perhaps, more accurately) form, 
offers a kind of  index, a card-catalog or database that facilitates access to the "actual" information or 
knowledge that is being sought.174  This is the kind of  information that would assist people to know where or 
how to find other information, to "know who knows what."175  It is perhaps within the purview of  this 
                         
166   McReadie and Rice 1999a;  McReadie and Rice 1999b.   
167   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 47.   
168   Menou 1995a, 464. 
169   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 46. 
170   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 46. 
171   Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.2.   
172   Menou 1995a, 465.   
173 Menou 1995a, 465.  McReadie and Rice (1995a, 48) also note that this conception of  information "requires, then, a 
shift from considering access as an act of  answering questions and retrieving facts, to a process of  resolving 
problematic situations and reducing equivocality." 
174   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 48.   
175   Borgatti and Cross 2003, 432.   
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conception that Twaweza might locate its work of  "brokering information."176  Here, of  course, we confront 
key questions—which will be discussed further below—about the nature of  the information that is brokered, 
its form, its accessibility, its production, and the power relationships embedded in all of  these dimensions.   
 
Information as part of  the communication process, finally, is a substantial move away from information-
as-object to a more process-oriented approach.  In this conception, information is understood to be "part of  
human behavior in the process of  moving through space/time to make sense of  one's world."177  Instead of  
assuming (explicitly or implicitly) that the transmission of  information is also the transmission of  meaning 
and knowledge, an understanding of  information as part of  a communication process "assumes meanings are 
in people, not in words"178 and recognizes that it is the social and political context in which information is 
produced, communicated, interpreted and utilized that gives it substance and purpose.  Information does not 
act, nor does it transform: "knowledge is what users do with data rather than what data do to users."179  
 
This conception of  information calls us to examine the question of  the relationship between data, 
information, and knowledge.  While the three are often confused or conflated, maintaining a distinction may 
be important.  According to Meadow and Yuan, "data usually means a set of  symbols with little or no 
meaning to a recipient.  Information is a set of  symbols that does have meaning or significance to their 
recipient.  Knowledge is the accumulation and integration of  information received and processed by a 
recipient."180  Information, then, may be understood as data that appears meaningful; knowledge is the 
integration of  this meaningful data into the actual, living context of  people.  This is similar to a distinction 
that Twaweza makes in at least one document, articulating a concern with "the way in which information 
turns into knowledge for meaning making" and asserting that "if  information is to become knowledge, 
people must do the work: they must be able to compare, contrast, connect and converse if  this 
transformation is to take place."181  Servaes and Malikhao write along these same lines that "meaning is not 
something that is delivered to people; people create or interpret it themselves.  If  knowledge is to be 
effectively employed by people, it needs to be interpreted and evaluated by those it is designed to help."182   
 
The crucial distinction here is that information only becomes knowledge (and thus only becomes useful) when 
it is transformed by real people, in real contexts, into meaning.  Knowledge, then, can be understood as 
"information given meaning and integrated with other contents of  understanding."183  Information is, quite 
literally, in-formation, not formed until it is made into meaning by a user.   Key question then, for those 
interested in the transformative potential of  information and knowledge, include:  when and how does 
information become knowledge?  How do different kinds of  information become knowledges differently? 
Do some kinds of  information lend themselves to transformative knowledge better than others?  We will turn 
now, however, to a related issue--that of  the "politics of  information."  
 
2. Neutral Facts?  The Question of  Power and the Production of  Information  
 
The notion that information is not meaning has a dangerous side.  To the extent that meaning is associated 
with all things subjective, political, laden with or shaped by relations of  power and inequity—and, conversely, 
things without "inherent" meaning are seen as objective, and neutral—then "information" may be understood 
as "value-free" data, a raw material that gains its political content only through use.  "The concept of  
                         
176   Twaweza.  "Concept Note: Twaweza External Evaluation." July 26, 2010.  p.9.   
177   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 48.   
178   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 47.   
179   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 48.   
180   Meadow and Yuan 1997, 701.   
181   Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.5. 
182 Servaes and Malikhao 2007, 28.  Freire (2006, 79) similary writes that "liberating education consists of  acts of  
cognition, not transferrals of  information."  
183   Bates 2006, 1042. 
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information," notes Agre, "carries a certain connotation of  neutrality."184  This is a dangerous view, since it 
disguises the many ways in which information is shaped by and constitutive of  power relationships.  As 
Dervin asserts, social relations of  power are involved in "the naming, designing and maintaining of  every 
aspect and nuance (apparent or hidden, of  recent design or lost in antiquity) of  the collection, storage, 
retrieval, and dissemination of  whatever that system (and the society in which it is embedded) calls 
information."185  
 
We identify a number of  dimensions in which power relations play a significant role in the creation, 
transmission and use of  information: 
 
Production of  information.  In its neutral guise as a set of  objective facts, information can appear either as 
a natural phenomenon (a product without a producer) or as a product of  a value-free production process—
one of  researching "the facts."  The question of  who—and to what end—is  actually generating information 
is hidden by such notions, and thus the question of  how, exactly, information comes to be shaped by social 
relationships of  power is obscured.  As numerous social scientists—particularly from a feminist standpoint—
have pointed out, even data (the supposed bastion of  objectivity and neutrality) has a politics.  Choices (and 
non-choices) about how it is conceptualized, measured, collected, aggregated and transformed into 
meaningful information can be profoundly influenced by the social positioning of  those who are generating 
data.186  This may be particularly true when data and information are generated by—or even in relation to—
large and powerful institutions such as governments and corporations.  As Onwumechili and M'Bayo point 
out, public (government controlled or owned) channels of  media and private channels in Africa have very 
different interests and operate in very different power configurations, thus generating different kinds of  
information with different effects.187  
 
In the production and dissemination of  information, then, we must ask: "what prevents long-established 
patterns of  power from being reproduced?   Who speaks, and who is heard?"188   For Twaweza, the question 
is about who makes the information that is being accessed, brokered and communicated?  Is this information 
production part of  a power-aware process of  "participatory media" such as that described by Jones and 
Gaventa?189   Are "ordinary citizens" themselves making media and sharing it?  Which ordinary citizens get to 
produce and disseminate information and which do not?  What patterns of  exclusion and marginalization 
might play out in the production of  the information with which Twaweza deals?190  Are professionals and 
development organizations producing information, rather, "on behalf" of  ordinary citizens?  Who decides, 
                         
184   Agre 1995, 225. 
185   Dervin 1994, 372. 
186   See, for example, Gillespie and Leffler 1987; Kelly 1994; Mountz et al.  2003.   
187 Onwumechili and M'Bayo 1995, 54.  Koningsveld (1984), cited by Schedler et al, takes this notion a step further 
and critiques "the common association of  public information with enlightenment, modernization and 
emancipation," suggesting that public information should instead be understood as a disciplinary effort that 
accommodates bodies and brains to the exigencies of  productive and administrative processes and estranges them 
from their own needs and capacities for the solutions to problems" (Schedler et al 1998, 449).  Schedler et al., 
however, critique this perspective as "a gross overestimation of  the role played by public information" (449). 
188   Gaventa 2002, 7 
189   Jones and Gaventa 2002, 22-23. 
190 The case of  the Daladala television show may be a useful place to begin asking such questions.  Two red flags 
appear in an article about the project in the Daily News.  First: "on her part, Bi Kiroboto commented, 'Everyone 
wants to talk about what is affecting him or her.  Some people are quite bitter at times.  Others use abusive 
language...But the programme is edited before being aired," Bibi Kiroboto explained.  Who edits? Second: "a 
representative from the Information Department (Maelezo), Mr Abraham Nyantori, commended the move of  
giving chance to the voiceless in the country, promising full government support...Mr Nyantori said his office will 
monitor the programme and point out any shortcomings that need to be addressed." Should we be concerned 
when a government information office "points our shortcomings?" This is not a disinterested party, and nor is it 
"ordinary citizens." (Daily News reporter, "TBC Plans Reality Talk Show." June 16, 2010).   
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really, what content is made and distributed?  
 
Terms of  the debate.   For those with restricted abilities to access information due to various forms of  
social exclusion, "not only can it be difficult to gain access to relevant information, but such information may 
not exist at all because others who are likely to be oblivious to issues of  import to [these groups] set the 
agenda and select what is to be reported on, debated, discussed, researched or questioned."191  Power is 
exercised in the realm of  information through the ability of  some groups, institutions, or individuals to frame 
the very languages and vocabularies in which information is coded.  Information about "rights, laws and 
entitlements,"192 for example, may contain within it a normative framing that validates the terms in which it 
speaks—validates citizens as subjects of  a particular form of  paternal state, as consumers of  certain state-
provided resources, as entitled to various services, as responsible for certain kinds of  behaviors in relation to 
the state.  To be more specific, Twaweza appears to have decided that the information that is most important 
to enhancing citizen agency is information about government policies and entitlements.  This means that 
other possible forms of  information have not been chosen as priority areas—information about social 
movements, popular struggles, non-state forms of  cooperative service provision, examples and stories of  
people taking collective action outside the purview of  the state and its "rights and responsibilities" (to name a 
few examples).  We do not point this out to place a specific value judgment on Twaweza's notions of  
citizenship, but simply to point out that the terms by which information is presented contain specific sets of  
values and are the manifestations of  power relationships.  Not everyone has the power to decide what these 
terms are.   
 
Frameworks of  meaning.  Here we engage with a much broader issue, related to but exceeding that of  
setting the terms of  a debate—that is, the power to "establish the framework for the very notion of  what 
information can mean"193  This may also be understood as the "worldview" within which the terms of  
information are generated and made sensible.194  As Stuart Hall writes, "Larger historical shifts, questions of  
political process and formation...issues of  social and political power, of  social structure and economic 
relations [are] simply absent not by chance, but because they [are] theoretically outside the frame of  reference." 
Again, we can ask the question of  who is able to establish these frameworks?  Who is able to challenge them? 
Whose questions, issues and struggles remain outside the frame of  what is considered meaningful, sensible 
and intelligible?  
 
Form and content.  With the "terms of  the debate" and worldview decided, power is also exercised in 
decisions about the form that information takes (to use Twaweza's language, the "verbal, written, visual, 
embodied, audio and so on" manifestations of  information)195 and the content of  that information (what is 
included, what is left out).  Form and content may be derived within the specific frames of  discourse and 
power of  those who make decisions about them, and may thus contain and reproduce certain assumptions 
and exclusions.  Written information, for example, excludes those who are non-literate.  Information 
presented in English excludes those who do not speak the language.  Information that requires an 
understanding of  basic statistics excludes those who have not had access to such education.  Twaweza gets at 
this dimension in noting that available information in East Africa is often "static, inert and authoritarian" and 
does not "lend itself  to 'uptake'."196  Related here, too, are questions about the kinds of  content that are 
included or not included: is content relevant to womens' realities?  To the realities of  youth?  To the realities 
of  landless people and migrants?  Who makes these decisions?  
 
Interpretations.  Information must, of  course, be interpreted in order for it to become useful and to be used 
                         
191   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 68.   
192   Twaweza.  "Concept Note: Twaweza External Evaluation." p.8. 
193   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 46.   
194   Huotari & Chatman 2001 
195   Twaweza.  "Concept Note: Twaweza External Evaluation." p.8.   
196   Twaweza.  "Concept Note: Twaweza External Evaluation." p.8.   
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for meaningful action.  Some of  this work may be attempted through decisions about terms, form and 
content, yet ultimately the work of  interpretation can only be done by the users of  information themselves.  
This work of  interpretation, however, is not always an inherent skill.  The question arises, then, about who 
has access to the tools of  interpretation.  Who is able to read a graph?  To interpret a public budget?  To 
interpret the meaning of  a particular law or regulation?  Who is able to acquire knowledge—the complex of  
experience, information and wisdom—that would facilitate interpretation?  Who is able to access other 
"relevant interpretations held by a society, group or organization?"197 
 
Access.  Finally, then, we have the question of  information access.  Power relations are at play, clearly, in 
questions about the actual, physical access to specific kinds of  information.  Barriers of  class, race, ethnicity, 
gender, mobility and age (among others) can hinder access to both information and to the resources and 
technologies required to access it.  Hafkin and Taggart, for example, in their study of  gender and information 
technologies in developing countries, concluded that "a series of  factors, including literacy and education, 
language, time, cost, geographical location of  facilities, social and cultural norms, and women's computer and 
information search and dissemination skills constrain women's access to information technology."198  These 
and other forms of  exclusions are well-documented.199  
 
Looking at these six dimensions in terms of  their manifestations in the realms of  data, information and 
knowledge can generate an analytical framework that makes apparent many of  the specific ways in which 
social relations of  power can manifest in the information process.  Table 1 below presents key questions 
which can be asked about each dimension.   
 
 Data Information  Knowledge  
Production  Who generates data? Who 
measures? 
 
Who produces information 
from available data?  
Who generates patterns of  
information that can be 
transformed into socially-
valid knowledge?  
 
Terms of  Debate How are the forms and 
techniques of  data 
collection and  measurement 
created and implemented? 
What is measured and why? 
What is not measured and 
why?  
 
How are the terms created 
that frame data into 
meaningful clusters of  
information? What 
languages are used? What 
terms are not used and why?  
How do the terms of  
knowledge systems get 
framed? Into what terms of  
knowledge must various 
forms of  information be 
assimilated?  
Frameworks of  
Meaning 
What regimes of  "truth" 
allow certain data (and not 
others) to appear real, 
reasonable, accurate, and 
valid?  
 
What frameworks of  
meaning are used to make 
sense out of  data? How are 
meanings embedded in the 
ways that information is 
presented or framed?  
 
What regimes of  knowledge 
are operating in a given 
context? How do these 
shape what kinds of  
information is intelligible or 
not?  
Form & Content  What specific forms do data 
take? How are they 
presented and described?  
What specific forms does 
information take? How is 
the content decided and 
How is knowledge stored, 
shared, presented? What 
kinds of  knowledge are 
                         
197  McReadie and Rice 1999a, 46.   
198  Hafkin and Taggart 2001, 2.   
199  Jorge 2002; Cukier et al.  2002; Rathgaber and Adera 2000.   
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 why?  
 
encouraged or discouraged? 
Interpretations How are data interpreted 
and by whom? What 
interpretations are excluded 
from consideration?  
 
How is information 
interpreted? What kinds of  
interpretations are 
encouraged and 
discouraged?  
How are different kinds of  
knowledge interpreted by 
others? What are the effects 
of  these interpretations?  
Access  Who is able to access data 
and the means to generate 
it?  
 
Who is able to access 
information?  
Who has access to what 
kinds of  knowledge?  
Table 1: Operations of  Power in Data, Information & Knowledge 
 
B. INFORMATION ACCESS  
 
We turn our discussion now to the question of  information access.  While we recognize that Twaweza has 
made efforts in recent documents to shift from an exclusive focus on "access to information" (as exhibited in 
earlier documents)200 to one on "generating and accessing information,"201 is it still clear that the question of  
access is central (though not exclusive) to the organization's focus.202  We can begin, then, by asking: how 
does Twaweza conceptualize access to information?  When the organization writes about "access to and 
availability of  information," what does it mean?  
 
We can find clues in this regard by looking to Twaweza's "specific (intermediate) objectives" in regard to 
information access.203  The concept means, generally, that "more ordinary citizens are able to access 
information about their rights, responsibilities and entitlements related to basic services, public resources, 
governance and other issues of  interest to them."  Here it is clear that the focus in on increased access for  
"ordinary citizens" as opposed to just for elites.  Access itself  is specified by at least three goals:  
 
• Understandable and widespread information.  "Available information is popularized and disseminated 
widely." 
 
• Diverse sources, content and vehicles.  "Sources and content of  information are more diverse, as are 
vehicles for transmitting information, especially at local levels." 
 
• Opportunities to Communicate.  "Citizens have more opportunity to generate and disseminate 
information and views, including through use of  new technologies."  
 
In digging further into issues of  information access, Twaweza notes that its specific areas of  focus "are 
premised on ideas about "what language is best used; what communicative mode is most appropriate (verbal, 
written, visual, embodied, audio and so on); what technologies are best used for communication; and so 
                         
200 See, for example, "Theory of  Change and Approach" in which the generation of  information is not substantially 
present as an objective.  Instead, it is clear that "emphasis will be placed on making information transparent" (p.7).   
201   Twaweza.  "Concept Note: Twaweza External Evaluation." July 26, 2010.  p.14.   
202 In its "Concept Note," for example, Twaweza describes "better access and generate information" as a goal on the 
first page, yet the substantive section on "information" later in the paper only focuses on "access to and availability 
of  information" (p.8).  Such observations aside, it is also clear that we have been charged by Twaweza, via our 
contract, to focus this paper on the question of  "access to information."  
203   Twaweza.  "Purpose, Goals and Objectives." p.3.   
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on."204  While the list includes some crucial elements—which we will discuss further in this paper—the "and 
so on" indicates that Twaweza's work of  elaborating what it means by "access to information" is not yet done.  
What other dimensions of  information access must be taken into account?  
 
1. Information for What? Concepts of  Access  
 
McReadie and Rice's literature review is again instructive.  They identify six ways in which "access to 
information" can be conceptualized.  While these frameworks are not mutually exclusive, they are often linked 
to very different notions of  "information" (discussed earlier) and have very different implications for how a 
project of  increasing information access might be understood and implemented.   
 
Access to knowledge.  As McReadie and Rice point out, "the most common understanding of  access to 
information can be categorized as access to knowledge and its representations."205  Access is about the ability 
to connect with meaningful information that will add to or transform the information-seeker's body of  
understanding.  This often refers to obtaining printed documents (with either words or images), citations to 
printed documents, data sets or representations of  data sets—“representations of  knowledge and, when put 
to use, potential building blocks for new knowledge."206  Such a conception "usually assumes that a message 
can be sent and received as intended by the sender and that that message, or the knowledge gained from it, 
might influence decisions made."207  Information and knowledge are often confused or conflated, then, as if  
the act of  accessing information automatically translated into the acquisition of  usable knowledge.  We see 
this idea as implicit in many of  Twaweza's current formulations in which "access to information" appears to 
be linked immediately with the ability of  citizens to use that information for meaningful action.  The question 
of  how (and if) information is transformed into useful knowledge must be addressed prior to any discussion 
about that knowledge as a catalyst or support for citizen action.   
 
Access to communication.  Linked with a notion of  information as a part of  the larger communication 
process, access is understood here to mean the ability of  people to participate—through the production, 
interpretation, and use of  information—in social networks of  communication.  "Such access," write 
McReadie and Rice in the language of  library science, "relies on a view of  relevance that is determined not by 
matching query statements with bibliographic references, but by matching the applicability of  what is 
ascertained to the everyday life of  the individual."208  Information becomes, in this sense, a relational 
concept—only meaningful and useful in a web of  social relationships.  The relevant question in this 
conception of  access is not so much about how much data one can obtain about a given topic (as in "access 
to knowledge" above), but rather about the kinds of  communicative channels, tools, and opportunities a 
person or group of  people have access to.  We will discuss the notion of  communication further, below.   
 
Access to participation.  Access to information in this framework is understood as a means through which 
participation in social and political life can be enabled.  As McReadie and Rice write, "democratic society is 
built on an assumption of  an informed citizenry who can gain access to information.  Implicit in the idea of  
access to information is that it leads to access to certain rights and lack of  access to information can preclude 
access to those rights.  Information is thus requisite to the right of  participation in the political process."209 
An informed public, what Milner calls a public with "civic literacy," makes for a more participative public and 
for a more robust democratic society.210  Twaweza shares this perspective quite strongly: information is 
                         
204   Twaweza.  "Concept Note: Twaweza External Evaluation." July 26, 2010.  p.8.   
205   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 49.   
206   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 49.   
207   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 49.   
208   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 53.   
209   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 56.   
210   Milner 2002.   
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understood as an essential tool for citizenship.211  
 
 
Access to goods or commodities.  Information access is often conceptualized as an economic issue, one 
that connects directly to questions about how people achieve and maintain livelihoods, interface with markets, 
and buy and sell goods and services.  "Access to information can influence or redistribute income, wealth or 
status."212  In this framework, information itself  is seen as a commodity and information access is understood 
to have both benefits and costs in the economic equation.  This conception of  access is often utilized in 
international development discourses about "information poor" and "information rich" countries and serves 
as a basis for advocating increased investment in information technology infrastructure in the name of  
economic growth.213  
 
Access to control.  In this framework, access to information is associated with—or even understood as—the 
exercise and maintenance of  power and control.  This conceptualization was, in effect, discussed above in our 
review of  the operations of  power within the production, dissemination and use of  information.  McReadie 
and Rice summarize this effectively: "access to control over which cultural, social or political issues to air or 
what questions to raise carries with it the potential for bias in favor of  those with privileged access over those 
seeking to gain access, those outside the publicly accepted frame of  reference or constructions of  logic."214 
Access as control carries with it a sense that information can be a tool for either oppression or liberation; the 
struggle for information access can be seen as a process of  seeking increased control over one's life and 
conditions of  livelihood.   
 
Access to technology.  This conceptualization of  access to information is a kind of  misnomer.  While each 
of  the other forms of  access can be framed in terms of  the question, "access for what?" (knowledge, 
participation, communication, economic development, control), this notion of  access confuses means with 
ends.  Technology may be understood as a means to accessing information, but it is not itself  a 
conceptualization of  what is being accessed and why.  Access to technology is also sometimes seen as the 
equivalent to information access, as if  the two notions were interchangeable.  "It is a common, but mistaken, 
assumption that access to technology equals access to information," write McReadie and Rice, "although it 
may be true that access to information is enhanced, speeded, broadened or integrated through technology, 
technology is not sufficient to provide access on its own."215  Furthermore, it must be noted that access to a 
system of  technology does not always translate to access to information at all; indeed, one can use a system 
and not find what one is seeking.216  
 
2. Information Access as a Process  
 
These above notions of  information access are focused on the object of  that access.  For McReadie and Rice, 
however, access to information must be understood as much more than a simple act of  accessing information 
for a purpose.  Information access is not a single phenomenon but rather is an active process.  Access to 
information is the process of  information-seeking.217  As such, it can be understood to have four primary phases, 
                         
211   See Twaweza.  "Theory of  Change and Approach." p.1.   
212   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 55.   
213   Thompson and Walsham 2010.   
214   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 55.   
215   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 51. 
216 McReadie and Rice 1999a, 52.  This is not to dismiss, however, the important issues and considerations that do 
exist in the links between technology and information access and production.  These issues will be addressed in the 
following section. 
217 McReadie and Rice (1999a, 57) also note that "the very term, information seeking process, reveals an assumption 
of  an intentional, rational, directed search for information on the part of  an individual or organization." This 
beckons us back to our earlier discussions of  the limits of  rational agency.  Such limits may also, then, place limits 
on information seeking and access.   
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or moments: the context in which information-seekers operate; the problems or situations that are to be 
addressed; the strategies implemented in the process of  seeking information; and the use of  (or non-use of) 
the information acquired.  Context "includes all the precursors to information seeking such as the social, 
political, economic, educational and experiential context" of  individuals, families, communities and larger 
populations.218  Situations (or problems) refer to "the particular set of  circumstances from which a need for 
information arises, along with the awareness, however unclear, that information may be useful in addressing 
the situation."219  Strategies "represent the dynamic process of  addressing the situation" of  information 
need "and include both planned and unplanned actions, directions, interactions or discoveries."220  Outcomes 
(or uses) "include retrieval and actual use or consumption of  information, as well as evaluation and possible 
redefinition and reiteration of  the process."221   An understanding of  these phases might lead Twaweza to ask 
such questions as:  
 
• Does the context in which people are living facilitate and enable access to and use of  (specific forms 
of) information?  
 
• How are problems formulated, understood, and experienced and how do these problems lend 
themselves (or not) to information-based solutions?  
 
• What kinds of  information might be useful to the problem as it is formulated?  What kinds of  
information seeking strategies are possible?  Which information seeking strategies are likely (or not) 
to be successful in acquiring useful information, in a useful form?  
 
• Once information is acquired, how is it used?  How is it interpreted, transformed into something 
meaningful, and utilized in the service of  addressing the formulated problem?  
 
3. Influences and Constraints on Information Access and Use  
 
With this information-seeking framework in hand, we are able to turn to the question of  what kinds of  
specific influences and constraints may influence the process at these various stages.  Table 2 offers a 
graphical summary of  these ideas in the form of  a blank "worksheet" that can be filled-in appropriately in a 
given context of  operation.  We will summarize the dimensions of  this chart only briefly, since many of  them 
have been addressed in various ways already in this paper.   
 
Access to and use of  information can be, according to the framework synthesized by McReadie and Rice 
from a wide variety of  sources in the information science literature, influenced and/or constrained by 
physical, cognitive, affective, economic, social or political factors, as well as by the processes they refer to as 
"mediation":222  
                         
218   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 58. 
219 McReadie and Rice 1999a, 59.  See also Wersig 1979 and Belkin 1980.  This notion of  the "problem" or "situation" 
may also be usefully understood in the context of  Freire's "problem-posing concept of  education" (2006, 81).   
220   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 59.   
221   McReadie and Rice 1999a, 60.   
222 McReadie and Rice 1999a, 62.  Another, and somewhat similar framework is offered by Menou that suggests seven 
attributes that contribute toward an individual or group's ability to use information effectively for action, all of  
which may be linked with dimensions of  agency discussed earlier in this paper (Menou 1995b, 485): the readiness or 
willingness of  the person or group to act; the propensity of  the person or group to make changes in their behavior; the 
capabilities of  the person or group to actualize the actions to which they might aspire; the factor of  appropriation, or 
"the sense of  ownership of  means and ends" (Menou 1995b, 485); "gestuality," or access to experiences or stories 
of  others taking action who can be followed or copied;"mediacy," media literacy, the "understanding of, and ability 
to use modern media"; and "objectification of  institutions," or a certain kind of  trust in the ability of  institutions 
to respond to the "effective use of  modern information" (Menou 1995b, 486).   Drawing on Sen's capabilities 
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• Physical factors include geography (urban/rural and core/periphery divides in terms of  access to 
information sources, technology and service, as well as ways in which geography is linked with other 
factors such as poverty and culture); environment (both generally, in terms of  ecological factors, and 
more specifically in terms of  ways in which a physical space "determines what is visually or audibly 
accessible and what is hidden")223; and display (how information is physically presented so as to be 
accessible or not to a given audience in a given context).   
 
• Cognitive factors include an understanding and awareness in regard to the information-seeking process 
and the information that is encountered (including a sense of  how information can be obtained, 
interpreted and used); facility and skill in seeking information and in utilizing it effectively (including 
crucial factors of  information and alphabetic literacy); matching refers to the match between a user's 
expectations, needs and abilities and the source of  information. 
 
• Affective, or emotional, factors include the attitudes that information-seekers have toward both the 
seeking process and the information itself  (belief  in its existence, accuracy and usefulness, in their 
abilities to find and understand it, and their feelings toward the activities and locations in and through 
which it must be accessed); the motivation that information-seekers have (or do not have) to do what is 
necessary to obtain a given set of  information (influences, for example, by their sense of  that 
information's credibility and usefulness); and confidence and comfort experienced by the information-
seeker when they plan or implement the work of  accessing information.   
 
• Economic factors include the benefits and costs of  the information seeking process for the 
information-seeker (real, anticipated or imagined); the value that the information-seeker ascribes to a 
given set of  information (measured financially or otherwise); and the economic resources required to 
access a given source of  information (from purchasing and maintaining technology to the broader 
issues of  wealth and poverty effects).   
 
• Social factors include cultural norms around who should or should not seek information and what 
they should or should not do with it (as well as which forms of  information are acceptable to access 
and use); class, race and gender factors that shape "the type of  information to which one has access" as 
well as contribute to other factors listed here (affective and economic, for example); education levels 
that determine one's ability (and confidence) to access and use information in various forms; 
membership in social networks which shape one's access (or lack thereof) to information; and the levels 
and kinds of  life experience that an information-seeker brings to the process.   
• Political factors include (as discussed extensively above) issues of  power, control, equity and 
participation in numerous dimensions of  information access, as well as its production and use.   
 
• Finally, the factor of mediation refers to various ways in which "our natural individual abilities to 
create, transmit, receive and process visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory or tactile messages are 
extended, expanded or enhanced technologically by media or...by human intermediaries."224 
Mediation can intensify information access constraints through numerous hurdles created by 
                                                                               
framework can yield further results in terms of  generating a list of  elements which must be present for 
information to be transformed into action.  Understood as a "good" that is valued by its "functioning," 
information can be said to require three groups of  "conversion factors" to translate its materiality into something 
that can capacitate action: "personal conversion factors (metabolism, physical condition, sex, reading skills, 
intelligence)...social conversion factors ( e/g/ public policies, social norms, discriminating practices, gender roles, 
societal hierarchies, power relations)...and environmental conversion factors (e.g.  climate, geographical location)" 
(Robeyns 2005, 99).   
223    McReadie and Rice 1999a, 61.   
224   McReadie and Rice 1999b, 85.   
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technologies and all of  the skills, resources and forms of  knowledge necessary to navigate them, and 
it can compensate for various access limitations by "spanning boundaries of  time and space, or 
overcoming physical, social, cognitive or other constraints."225  
 
Table 2: Influences and Constraints on Access to Information (adapted from McReadie and Rice 1999b, 92).   
 
 
C. INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION?  
 
Before moving on to the question of  linkages between access to information and citizen agency and action, 
we wish to briefly explore an important conceptual and discursive difference that we have encountered in the 
                         
225   McReadie and Rice 1999b, 86.   
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literature, namely a distinction between an information-oriented approach to development and a 
communication-oriented approach.  Twaweza might benefit, we believe, from positioning itself  more clearly 
in relation to this debate.  On one hand, we see organizations such a Twaweza focusing on "access to 
information" and building their discussions of  social change and knowledge around various formulations of  
"information" as a concept and transformative resource.  On the other hand, we find a substantial literature--
particularly in the emerging realm of  development discourse known as "civic-driven change"—that is critical 
of  the information-centered approach and opts for one based in a discourse of  "communication" instead.  
Bieckmann offers a useful summary of  a commonly-made distinction:  
 
Providing information is a one-way and top-down process.  Communication, on the other 
hand, means that power will be shared.  Communication enables citizens to take part in 
decision-making processes.  Communication is also a crucial aspect in the translation of  
civic involvement into collective action for change.  Instead of  vertical flows of  
information, communication is about horizontal exchange and dialogue.  Communication 
connects people and the hundreds of  small CDC initiatives that take place at the local level, 
for example through the use of  ICT but also through the active involvement of  
'communicators': one of  the roles NGOs can play.226  
 
The distinction between information as a top-down process and communication as (potentially) horizontal is 
made within information theory as well.  Dervin writes, for example, that "information is defined as that 
which instructs and so despite efforts to the contrary, information systems are designed as transmission 
systems, not participation systems."227  This focus on participation is a key component of  an alternative to 
the information-access-centered approach.  "A different approach," write Fowler and Biekart, "would 
recognize the roots of  communication in access, sharing and participation—a horizontal dialogue with two-
way exchange—rather than a unidirectional process to fill a person's 'knowledge bank' in uncritical ways."228 
Gumucio-Dagron summarizes: "leave access behind and adopt process."229  
 
Twaweza is, admittedly, difficult to position clearly in this debate.  On one hand, the organization overtly 
focuses its discourse on "access to information" and its partners appear to be primarily engaged in offering 
information to people rather than facilitating communication between them.230  On the other hand, 
Twaweza's discourse of  "enhancing citizen agency" by "expanding the channels and the circuits through 
which information is accessed and generated [and] multiplying the means and modes of  communication of  
such information"231 appears to be somewhat more in line with the communicative approach advanced by the 
civic-driven change advocates.232  How does Twaweza position itself  in this discussion?  Is there a tension, 
within Twaweza, between a desire to focus on citizen agency (which might lead to a focus on communication) 
and a desire to focus on large-scale mass media work (which lends itself  nicely to concepts of  information 
access)?  
 
LINK I: DOES ACCESS TO INFORMATION LEAD TO  
                         
226   Bieckmann 2008, 7, citing Alfonso Gumucio Dagron. 
227   Dervin 1994, 380.   
228   Fowler and Biekart 2008, 4.   
229   Gumucio-Dagron 2003, 6.   
230 We are thinking here of  Daladala TV, Uwezo, ShujaazFM and the Makutano Junction project.  Daraja appears to 
be somewhat of  an exception up to this point.  http://www.twaweza.org/index.php?c=41 
231   Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.2.   
232 We are somewhat confused in regard to Twaweza's choice to use the term "citizen-driven change" rather than 
"civic-driven change." We are aware that Rakesh Rajani participated for a brief  time in the civic-driven change 
initiative hosted by the International Institute of  Social Studies and others, and that he was replaced in this 
participation by Gumucio-Dagron (whose writings appear to be specifically critical about an "information access" 
approach).  Is there a specific political difference (or tension) between Twaweza's CDC and that of  the civic-driven 
change initiative? We cannot speculate, but simply raise the question.   
Miller, Hartwell & Rossman, Unpacking Twaweza’s Theory of  Social Change                                   page 39 
 
ENHANCED CITIZEN AGENCY?  
 
"Some kinds of  communication on some kinds of  issues, brought to the attention of  
some kinds of  people under some kinds of  conditions have some kinds of  effects."233  
 
We have arrived (finally) at our first linkage in Twaweza's circles of  change model—that between increased 
information and enhanced citizen agency.  Twaweza's claim is essentially this: "while information alone is not 
sufficient, it is a vital and necessary driver for change."234  Implied here is the apparently straightforward 
assertion that information can (in part) lead to social action and change.  Our discussion of  information and 
information access above should make it sufficiently clear that the question of  citizens obtaining useful 
information in the first place is tremendously complex and riddled with variables that might easily lead to 
outcomes involving little or no actual functional access to the types of  information Twaweza views as 
important.  Our discussion, likewise, of  citizen agency should make it clear that citizen action—even if  it is 
actualized—can be constrained from leading to actually-transformative effects.235  Assuming that the 
numerous constraints to both effective citizen agency and information access and the production of  citizen 
knowledge can be overcome (and setting the question of  how Twaweza will address these issues aside), we 
can now ask whether, and under what conditions—having obtained access to information—citizens might be 
empowered and inspired to take transformative action.   
 
The lack of  access to information has been clearly identified as a problem that constrains citizen agency and 
action by numerous observers.  Ngwainmbi, for example, writes that, "in the wake of  rapid ideological and 
infrastructural change all over the world today, many rural people do not get adequate information from the 
mass media and, therefore, cannot take advantage of  available technology to change their environment.  
Individual problems that could be resolved or prevented through shared information remain undetected and 
unresolved."236  The connection between information access and a robust democratic polity has also been 
noted.  As Francis and James write, "the ballot box is only part of  the wider institutional context: democracy 
also presupposes access to information, transparent procedures of  government and an effective media."237 
Steiner similarly notes that "a critical level of  information on local government affairs among the population 
is necessary to ensure meaningful participation."238  Information appears to be an important ingredient in 
citizen participation and democracy; yet does this mean that access to information leads to increased citizen 
agency and to democratic transformation? An ingredient to the soup does not necessarily cause the soup to 
come into being.   
 
The relationship between information (and media) and change has been widely explored in the development 
literature.  A number of  scholars trace this research back to Daniel Lerner's 1958 study on communication 
and development in the Middle East which "viewed development and communication as 'a set of  
interdependent processes though which 'traditional' social structure is transformed into a 'modern' social 
structure'."239  In this "causal approach,"240 development practitioners understood that peoples' "behaviors 
and attitudes must be changed or modified so as to pave way for their transformation to 'modern' individuals" 
and that the communication of  information and ideas about the modern world could effect this change.241 
                         
233   Berelson 1948, quoted in Nwosu 1995, 36.   
234   Twaweza.  "Situation Analysis." p.9.   
235 To add an example: Francis and James (2003) show that in rural Uganda, citizens who become aware of  
entitlements through increased access to information may be constrained from meaningful democratic 
participation for other reasons including scarcity of  overall resources, decisional constraints placed on federal 
funding sources, local political hierarchies, personal access to resources, etc.   
236   Ngwainmbi 1995, 3.  See also Steiner 2008.   
237   Francis and James 2003, 326.   
238   Steiner 2008, 37.   
239   Nwosu 1995, quoting Rhodes 1970. 
240   Mowlana and Wilson 1990.   
241   Nwosu 1995, 13.   
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Servaes and Malikhao summarize the continuing power of  these ideas:  
 
In the one-and-a-half  decades after Lerner's influential 1958 study...communication 
researchers assumed that the introduction of  media and certain types of  educational, 
political and economic information into a social system could transform individuals and 
societies from traditional to modern.  Conceived as having fairly direct and powerful effects 
on Third World audiences, the media were seen as magic multipliers, able to accelerate and 
magnify the benefits of  development.242  
 
This causal approach is closely related to the communication theory known as the "transmission model," 
which conceptualizes "communication as a more or less undisturbed transmission of  messages from source 
to receiver."243  Such an approach—which might be called, in Freirian terms—a "banking" approach to 
knowledge244 -- “emphasizes one-way vertical communication in which true communication is prohibited."245 
This is a process which Twaweza is explicitly seeking to avoid in its description of  how its "access to 
information" work should be implemented.   "The concept of  access to information can equate with the 
vaccination idea in modernization theories, which prescribes injections of  information for the 'information 
poor'.  People are not blank slates on which information can write its purposes and cause 'behavior 
change'."246   In considering the ways (explored earlier) in which Twaweza's conception of  citizenship is quite 
convergent with dominant ideas about the "modern individual," along with the sense in which the 
communication of  information is seen as a "trigger" of  agency, we are left to wonder if  Twaweza has fully 
escaped the domain of  this transmission theory.  Indeed, the commonly-used notion of  "uptake"247 of  
information appears to confirm a transmission-style theory, as if  information was a "thing" to be installed 
into the recipient for later use.  Figure 5 illustrates, albeit in a somewhat tongue-in-cheek manner, how 
Twaweza's comic about water pump loans for farmers could be (though does not necessarily need to be) read 
as a version of  the transmission/modernization (and privatization) approach to development communication.   
 
Another approach to the relationship between development and information has been called the "diffusion 
model."  In this conception, based on the assumption that "communication by itself  can generate 
development regardless of  socio-economic and political conditions," information spreads and causes  
                         
242   Servaes and Malikhao 2007, 12, quoting Fair 1989.   
243   Schedler et al.  1998, 450-451.   
244   Freire 2006. 
245   Mowlana and Wilson 1990, 74.   
246   Twaweza.  "Concept Note: Twaweza External Evaluation." p.8.   
247   See, for example, Twaweza, "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.5.   
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 Figure 5: A "Transmission Model" Reading of  Twaweza's Cartoon (adapted from Twaweza, "Situation Analysis" cover image). 
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change as people adopt new ideas.248  While still based on a model of  communication as the movement of  a 
message, fundamentally unmodified, from sender to receiver and on the idea that ideas would change people's 
behaviors, the diffusion model paid more attention to the ways in which information—particularly via mass 
media—can be moved through society via channels of  social communication.  The "two step flow" concept, 
which suggested that "the flow of  information in the first step was from source to opinion leaders and in the 
second step from opinion leaders to their followers" (Mowlana and Wilson 1990, 58) was essentially a 
recognition that mass media could effectively inject information into a society, but that personal relations 
were the key to this information actually having persuasive (and thus behavior-changing) effects.  Hence, 
communication-for-development theory went from believing in simply the magical multiplier effects of  
information transmission to "magical multipliers of  information diffusion."249  How different, Twaweza 
might ask itself, is this diffusion model from the notion of  "generating buzz"?250  
 
How do transmission models of  communication for development hold up to empirical scrutiny? Robust 
evidence is scarce, in part due to the challenge of  tracing causal connections in complex social contexts.251 It 
does appear, however, that many scholars have been—and remain—skeptical of  the power of  transmission-
style media.  In 1976, Starosta stated that "mass media do not and generally cannot 'persuade' anyone to 
adopt a new practice.  While media energize, stimulate, introduce, prod, implore, or 'create a climate 
conducive to,' they still reach primarily those groups high in media exposure and usually favorably 
predisposed toward change."252   Servaes and Malikhao, surveying the field in 2007, conclude that "research 
has shown that, while the public can obtain information from impersonal sources like radio and television, 
this information has relatively little effect on behavioral changes."253  
 
Others are more optimistic.  Reinikka and Svensson admit that "while buzzwords like 'information,' 
'knowledge,' and 'empowerment' now pepper the policy debate, there is little quantitative evidence on the 
impact of  policy measures aimed at achieving them,"254 they offer evidence from one case study in Uganda to 
demonstrate that information access through public media can have real effects on lessening dynamics of  
political corruption.  They show, with data from a quantitative survey, that a national policy of  publishing 
information about financial transfers to local governments for education support significantly decreased the 
amount of  money that "disappeared" in the process.  Thus, "through the relatively inexpensive policy action 
of  a mass information campaign, Uganda dramatically reduced district government diversion of  public grant 
funds aimed at improving primary education under its universal education policy."255  
 
Given the seemingly tenuous conclusions and results of  research into transmission-style development 
communication, and thus the thinness of  theories associated with it, how then can we think about the 
potential linkages between information and citizen action?  Kirzner makes a helpful distinction between 
"information-knowledge" and "action-knowledge."256  Not all information, he suggests, leads to or inspires 
action.  Furthermore, "action often does un-alertly ignore fact, which, in the usual sense of  the word, one 
                         
248   Mowlana and Wilson 1990, 57.   
249   Mody 2000, 189.   
250   Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.8.   
251   Menou 1995a.   
252   Quoted in Nwosu 1995, 37-38.   
253   Servaes and Malikhao 2007, 16.   
254   Reinikka and Svensson 2006, 1.   
255 Reinikka and Svensson 2006, 21.  Focusing specifically on the availability and use of  information communication 
technologies (ICTs), Zanello and Maassen's study also painted a bright picture for the potential of  information and 
communication access to "be used in support of  (organized) citizen action." While their survey presented a 
number of  examples of  contemporary ICT use in East Africa, it does not present evidence regarding--specifically--
the efficacy of  information access to trigger citizen agency.  Much speculative support is offered for such a 
connection, but empirical data is (as is the reality in the literature) quite scarce (Zanello and Maassen 2009).   
256   Kirzner 2005, 77.   
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'knows'."257  These assertions are confirmed by some of  the literature on the low correlations found in North 
America between peoples' information about environmental problems and their concrete actions to address 
them in daily life (such as recycling and energy conservation behavior).258  "What determines whether 
knowledge-as-information becomes action-knowledge is not, in general, the result of  any deliberate decision," 
writes Kirzner, "two individuals may 'know' the same facts; one of  them grasps the opportunity which these 
facts represent, the second fails to do so."259  What, then, makes for such a difference?  How might we 
identify under what condition information might become action-knowledge?  
 
Twaweza, as noted at the beginning of  our analysis of  information, identifies four primary ways that 
information might link with, facilitate or lead to action:  
 
• Outcomes.  Information about outcomes ("including comparisons"260) may allow people to 
"compare their situation with others" and thus inspire them to take action.  In the absence of  further 
discussion from Twaweza, we can speculate that the psychological mechanisms of  information-
action here might be feeling of  indignation and injustice when faced with problematic differences; 
feelings of  desire for what others may have (interestingly similar to the consumer mentality often 
critiqued in highly industrialized countries)261; and possibly a sense of  "rights" that might be invoked 
when shown that people elsewhere in the same country (for example) have access to something 
different via government provision.  All of  these potential mechanisms may be tempered or 
augmented by the many factors described above in our discussions of  constraints on agency and 
information access and use.   
 
• Processes.  Information around processes ("including information that triggers the imagination"262) 
refers to what Twaweza elsewhere calls "stories of  ordinary people taking initiative, making a 
difference."263  The links between information and action here could be understood to be some form 
of  inspiration and the cultivation of  empowerment from knowledge that "if  others like us can do 
this, so can we."   Do inspiring stories lead to action?  Perhaps, though again in a context mediated by 
constraints outlined earlier.   
 
• Peer Pressure.  Information "that raises peer pressure (shaming)" may refer to ways in which 
information transparency—at a local government level—might generate conditions under which 
local officials would be shamed into behaving in more "appropriate" ways.  This information-action 
mechanism may sometimes work (as, possibly, in Reinikka and Svensson's example), but it also runs 
up against issues of  local social relations and cultural mores as discussed earlier.   
 
• Coordination.  Information "that enables coordination (everybody that is concerned about health 
should wear his hair in a pony tail)"264  Despite the funny example, this dimension should be taken 
seriously.  It is, we would argue, much more about communication than about information.  What 
forms of  communication might facilitate increased coordination and organizing among people 
directly affected by a given issue or problem?  Literature on social movements has shown that 
communication is a crucial dimension to effective organizing and movement-building.265  Of  all the 
mechanisms connecting information and action mentioned by Twaweza, we suggest that this 
                         
257   Kirzner 2005, 78.   
258   Costanzo 1986; Kempton 1993 
259   Kirzner 2005, 79.   
260   Twaweza.  'unpacking the Theory of  Change." p.2.   
261   See, for example, Bauman 2007.   
262   Twaweza.  'unpacking the Theory of  Change." p.2.   
263   Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.3.   
264   All quotes in this bulleted section are from Twaweza.  "Unpacking the Theory of  Change." p.2. 
265   See, for example, Figueroa et.al. (2002). “Communicating for Social Change Working Paper Series.”  
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dimension may be most fruitful to explore.  Here, the "brokering role" might be transformed into 
something more like a networking role between and among grassroots organizing efforts.  "What is 
'new' is to be found in trying to look through the eyes of  citizens to gather and join up experiences 
of  bringing about change that are scattered around the landscape of  aid."266  
 
D. KEY QUESTIONS ON INFORMATION 
 
¾ How does Twaweza distinguish between data, information, and knowledge? 
 
¾ Are the channels and networks that Twaweza is working with the most effective for animating access 
to and generation of  information to enhance citizen agency? 
 
¾ What “tipping points” would signal an ecosystem of  change?  How will these be attended to and 
measured? 
 
 
V. CITIZEN MONITORING FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
A. MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
As a core part of  its work, Twaweza seeks to encourage people to “monitor and discuss what’s going on.”  
We gather from the organization’s literature that Twaweza wants people to monitor for two primary reasons: 
first, because monitoring can be understood as an act of  citizen agency and, therefore, as an end in itself.  
Second, citizen monitoring has the potential to support action for accountability, or the engagement of  citizens in 
relationships of  accountability with the institutions they confront in their lives.  For Twaweza, this second 
purpose is primarily oriented toward increasing the accountability of  government institutions that provide 
basic services so that these services might be improved.  We will discuss the question of  improving basic 
services and, specifically, its relation to information access, monitoring and accountability in the next section.  
Here, we focus primarily on the concepts and practices invoked by Twaweza around the activity of  
“monitoring for accountability.”  
 
Monitoring for accountability, we believe, must be understood as two distinct steps: monitoring, in the sense 
of  gathering information about patterns, differences, behaviors; and taking action that generates, activates or 
sustains actual relationships of  accountability.  To be sure, the act of  monitoring itself  may be an action that 
has real effects, but it must not be assumed that these effects are automatic.  It is thus important to separate 
out the question of  gathering comparative information from that of  engaging in action that leads to or 
fosters accountability.  In other words, people may monitor, but this does not necessarily mean that accountability will 
be enacted.  We treat monitoring and accountability in this report, therefore, as separate but interrelated 
elements.  Twaweza’s focus—in its literature at least—is on the monitoring side; we suggest that the 
accountability side must be featured in equal part in future articulations of  the organization’s work.   
 
B. CITIZEN MONITORING  
 
Clearly, Twaweza seeks to challenge conventional notions of  monitoring as they have been expressed and 
implemented by many international development projects.  “Monitoring in the world of  development has 
become reified, turned into events that are mediated through scorecards and other techniques.”267  Yet 
Twaweza also does not wish to eliminate the development language of  “monitoring”268; rather, the 
                         
266   Fowler and Biekart 2008a, 1.   
267   Twaweza.  "Concept Note: Twaweza External Evaluation." p.9.   
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organization seeks to generate a new definition: “When we talk about citizen monitoring, we are talking about 
a simpler, day to day form of  monitoring, initially based on noticing differences, on keeping track in one’s 
mind, and on sharing this process of  keeping track.”269  Monitoring, in this conception, is expanded to signify 
a very general process of  attentiveness and scrutiny on the part of  citizens.  We have moved from a 
formalized data-collection process to a broad process of  “noticing differences.”  
 
While Twaweza’s expansion of  monitoring appears to validate forms of  citizen observation and knowledge 
creation that other, more narrow, definitions might exclude, we are left to wonder if  the concept retains any 
real content at all; what is the difference, in such a conception, between citizen monitoring and the daily 
process of  observing and discussing one’s reality that most people are continuously engaged in?  Does 
Twaweza seek to differentiate at all between the comparing and contrasting behavior that is always present 
when “ordinary people are simply getting on with their lives”270  and forms of  observation that are able to be 
articulated as political claims, demands and actions?  While a hard and fast line between the two domains is 
surely problematic (and the interconnections between the two are crucial), strategic interventions on the part 
of  Twaweza when it comes to supporting some efforts and not others must (and, we are certain, already do) 
take into account such differences.  These might be helpful for the organization to further articulate: what 
kinds of  monitoring (in the broad sense) do and do not lead to the possibility of  citizen action and change? 
 
Clearly, monitoring—in its many forms—is a key link for Twaweza between citizens’ access to information 
and the actual improvement of  basic services.  Monitoring is both a source of  information and an action that 
citizens might take upon gaining certain information (learning, for example, about how much money a local 
school is supposed to receive and then deciding to monitor how much is actually received).  For Twaweza, 
there are four primary purposes to monitoring, each of  which connects with the organization’s 
conceptualizations of  information access and use:  
 
• Monitoring is “important in relation to policies, budgets, laws and entitlements.” Citizens, armed 
with information about these structures, can monitor their implementations and, in so doing, enable 
themselves to hold government to account for noncompliances.  This purpose links with—and 
affirms—Twaweza’s focus on citizenship as a specific relation of  entitlement to state-provided 
services (as discussed in the earlier section on citizenship).  Monitoring here is specified as a form of  
shared observation that is not general, but rather targeted at very specific institutions and types of  
content.   
 
• Monitoring enables a person to “monitor one’s situation in relation to others’,” hence generating 
comparisons that might trigger action.  Rather than specifying a target for monitoring (as does the 
previous purpose), this purpose suggests a mechanism by which observation may be transformed 
into something that influences the exercise of  citizen agency.  The operative assumptions appear to 
be that, first, people are motivated by seeking to minimize differences between themselves and 
others—a very specific cultural assumption that requires unpacking; and second, that—in the case 
of  a shared understanding of  rights—people are moved to act when they understand rights to be 
unequally realized across space.  Here, the assumption is that people are driven by a particular sense 
of  fairness, and that violations of  this sense lead to ameliorating action.  This, too, is a particular 
cultural assumption that may or may not hold in the context of  every community or group.   
 
• Monitoring “can help people compare the past with the present,” allowing them to generate further 
comparisons and to see changes over time (thus noting improvements or lack thereof).  Here, 
monitoring is also about comparisons, but focused more toward the possibility of  evaluating change 
                                                                               
securing funding from sources that give credence to "monitoring" activities?  
269   Twaweza.  "Concept Note: Twaweza External Evaluation." p.9.   
270   Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.1.   
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and progress.  Monitoring can be a tool with which the work of  social change advocacy—or changes 
made by an institution which is being held to account—can be measured, evaluated and adjusted 
accordingly in a learning process.   
  
• Monitoring “can enable perspectives to be shared and compared.”271 Through the generation of  
new information via the monitoring process, citizens may be able to share this information with 
others and thus instigate dialog and possible action in relation to identified problems.  Here, 
monitoring is a tool for communication, and this communication—it is hoped—has the chance to 
spark action and effect change.   
 
A very specific picture emerges from these conceptions of  monitoring, one which is distinct from the broad 
notion of  “keeping track.”  The monitoring that Twaweza is interested in is focused on citizen-state 
relationships and the various kinds of  financial and material entitlements that are associated with these 
relationships; assumes that people are motivated by comparison, a desire to be similar to others, and/or a 
sense of  fairness (and indignation) in regard to shared rights (hence this also assumes that people have and 
know their rights); seeks to facilitate evaluation and learning with regard to strategies of  advocacy (for 
entitlements); and, finally, is meant as a tool to foster “keeping track in one’s mind, and on sharing this 
process of  keeping track”272 and coordination for citizen action (with regard to state entitlements).   
 
1. Dimensions of  Monitoring  
 
A monitor, in Latin, is literally “one who warns”273  Monitoring, then, is not simply about observation.  It is 
about the communication of  observation with others; it is about observation and scrutiny that is shared by a 
group or community.  Five key questions are identified in the literature on monitoring:  
 
• Who monitors?274  
• What do they monitor?275  
• When do they monitor?276  
• How do they monitor?277  
• Why do they monitor (or, monitoring for what)?278  
 
With regard to the question of  who monitors, Twaweza’s work appears to be somewhat divided.  On one hand, 
the organization seeks explicitly to support projects in which citizens are directly, in their daily lives and work, 
engaged in observation, scrutiny, and comparison that might spark action.  On the other hand, the 
organization appears to be engaged in significant monitoring projects in which citizens are not the primary 
monitors, but are, rather, the recipients of  information generated by NGO-based monitoring.279  There is no 
necessary contradiction or problem with approaching monitoring from both directions; we do not, however, 
see an explicit acknowledgement in Twaweza’s literature that both approaches are important and that the 
organization is committed to a combination of  the two.  This acknowledgement is crucial, since—as 
elaborated in the previous section on information access—the question of  who produces knowledge is 
crucial to understanding its nature and effects and to taking active responsibility for the power relationships 
                         
271   All quotes in this bulleted list from Twaweza.  "Concept Note: Twaweza External Evaluation." p.9.   
272   Twaweza.  "Concept Note: Twaweza External Evaluation." p.9.   
273   Wiktionary.  http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/monitor.  Accessed 8/20/10.   
274   Collier 2007, 10. 
275   Theis 2003, 6.   
276   Collier 2007, 10.   
277   Theis 2003, 6; Goetz and Gaventa 2001.   
278   Theis 2003, 5.   
279 We refer here primarily to Uwazi, which appears to be significantly active as an aggregator of  professionally-
produced data, a supporter of  NGO-based monitoring, and a funder of  citizen monitoring.   
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that inhere in its production.   
 
What is monitored (and who decides) is another central issue.  As noted above, Twaweza is focused specifically 
on projects which monitor “policies, budgets, laws and entitlements.”  This is quite specific, and raises at least 
two key issues.  First, we encounter the issue noted above of  the normative reinforcement this focus makes 
on a certain model of  citizen-state relations.  This has been engaged in earlier sections.  The second issue is 
this: if  monitoring is about citizens “keeping track in [their  minds], and on sharing this process of  keeping 
track,”280 then what happens if  Twaweza’s priorities are not those of  citizens?  To quote Twaweza’s own 
critical question, “what if  water, health and education are not at all key areas in which people will want to/are 
able to exercise agency?”281  What if  the things people observe, notice and keep track of  are different from 
those that Twaweza believes to be important?  Who then decides what, really, the priorities of  monitoring 
should be?  What are the power dynamics involved when Twaweza (via Uwazi) offers money for people to 
monitor specific things (in specific ways)?  How does Twaweza acknowledge and transparently engage with 
the challenges of  these power dynamics?  
 
Collier’s framework for research on accountability raises the question of  timing in monitoring: when monitoring 
occurs in the processes of  service provision, allocation, and decision-making is important in determining the 
potential uses of  the information collected.  Collier distinguishes between ex ante scrutiny (how decisions are 
authorized prior to the actual enactment of  a given policy or entitlement) and ex post scrutiny (evaluation of  
how a given policy was implemented or a given service was provided).282  This distinction can be viewed in 
light of  Kabeer’s notion—discussed in our earlier section on agency—of  “first and second order choices”: 
“decisions fundamental to the shape of  a person’s life,” and “choices that affect life’s quality but to not 
constitute its defining parameters.”283  Ex ante monitoring may involve examination of  the actual processes by 
which basic decisions are made, entitlements generated and institutional frameworks established.  Ex post 
monitoring focuses more on the quality of  implementation of  these already-made decisions and already-
established parameters.  Where a given monitoring initiative focuses in this temporal process has great bearing 
on the scope of  social change that might be imagined and enacted by those who are generating and sharing 
monitoring information.   
 
How monitoring is done is also crucial in determining outcomes, particularly in relation to the question of  
accountability.  This “how” has at least two dimensions: the format or methodology through which 
monitoring (and its communication) takes place and the process by which this methodology is implemented.  
In the format dimension, monitoring can be executed via a wide variety of  formats including mapping, 
surveys, forums, institutionalized participation structures and the public dissemination of  data (to name a 
few).284  Twaweza is clearly not limited in its vision to any particular form; indeed, strong emphasis is placed 
on “innovative ideas” regarding the ways in which citizen monitoring might take place.285  This openness to a 
variety of  forms and formats is, we believe, a real strength in Twaweza’s approach, though one that must be 
tied to (as the organization understands) ongoing assessment and evaluation of  the effectiveness of  various 
forms of  monitoring.   
 
The second dimension of  the “how” of  monitoring is in regard to the implementation of  various formats, 
particularly the degree and form of  citizen participation.  As Welle points out in her survey of  “mapping for 
accountability” projects, “who draws up the map has important implications for the levels of  accountability 
that can be achieved.”286  Uwazi’s strategy of  offering money to “entrepreneurial individuals and 
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organizations who are able to monitor”287 appears to be intriguing and complex in this regard.  On one hand, 
such funding may function to make the work of  monitoring more accessible to people who would otherwise 
not have access to the time and resources necessary for such work.288  On the other hand, the resources 
required for people to access Twaweza’s offer of  funds, develop and communicate a proposal, and carry out 
the subsequent work according to plan may constitute a set of  formidable obstacles to real participation by 
“ordinary citizens.”  This raises a substantial question regarding Uwazi’s strategy: To what extent does this 
financial incentive approach reproduce problematic dynamics of  free-market economics in which questions 
of  power, privilege and differential access to resources (economic, social, educational, etc.) are pushed aside in 
celebration of  the ‘entrepreneurial spirit”?  Amidst a rhetorical affirmation of  the freedom to propose 
projects and—if  they have enough merit in the eyes of  intrepid investors—to have these projects funded, 
only a small group of  (already well-endowed) people are able to exercise this entrepreneurial freedom.   
 
Finally, we arrive at the question of  why monitoring should occur in the first place.  What is monitoring for?  Theis 
offers a summary of  possibilities:  
 
Monitoring and evaluation can be undertaken for a range of  purposes, including to measure 
impact, outputs, efficiency, effectiveness or change; to strengthen accountability; to facilitate 
organizational learning; to strengthen partnerships and team building; to support advocacy 
efforts; or to influence an organization’s culture.289  
 
We have already established Twaweza’s specific take on these options.  Monitoring is meant, ultimately, to 
generate accountability between citizens, basic service providers, and the institutions that control resources 
crucial to these services.  In an auxiliary fashion, monitoring is also meant to spark citizen agency and 
enhance citizen communication and coordination in the work of  “holding government to account.”290  Here, 
once again, we see a tension identified earlier in this paper between Twaweza’s ostensible goal of  “enhancing 
citizen agency”291 and the organization’s specific focus on “service delivery in water, education and health.”292  
Much work on monitoring, as reflected in the scholarly literature, is about seeking to leverage monitored 
information to make policy or policy implementation changes.293  Monitoring as a tool for enabling citizen 
action might, however, be a different type of  activity or lead to different strategies or goals.  Citizens may, in 
observing, comparing and communicating differences, decide that “holding government to account” is not a 
viable or desirable strategy; they may, instead, seek to enact private or collective solutions to problems that 
they have identified.  How, we ask again, does Twaweza navigate this issue?  Particularly given that Twaweza 
has financial resources that it can leverage to encourage certain kinds of  action and focus over others, how 
does the organization work with the tension between its very specific areas of  focus (and methods of  focus) 
and the desire for robust and real citizen-driven change?  
 
C. ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Setting aside such questions for the moment, we turn to Twaweza’s particular focus in regard to monitoring: 
accountability by government for the provision of  basic services.  Twaweza makes the link, in its work, that 
citizen (and, presumably, NGO) monitoring can lead to increased accountability on the part of  service 
providing institutions.  This accountability will, in turn, lead to improvements in the quality of  services 
provided.  This is a proposition supported and echoed by many authors.  Theis, for example, states that 
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“monitoring is a fundamental approach to promoting human rights.  The collection and dissemination of  
data about unfulfilled rights and about rights violations puts pressure on duty bearers to meet their 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfill human rights.”294   Jameel, similarly, points out that “one popular 
recommendation for improving services is to mobilize and empower communities to hold providers 
accountable.  Service recipients may be unaware of  the quality of  their care, or of  available opportunities for 
improvements.  If  so, information and mobilization campaigns could improve service delivery.”295  But what, 
exactly, is “accountability” and what kinds of  links can be established between monitoring and an increase in 
accountability between citizens and government?  
 
1. Defining Accountability  
 
Accountability, over the past several years, has become a kind of  buzzword in the world of  international 
development literature.296  Its meanings vary as widely as the diverse actors who utilize the term.  As Fox 
writes, “one person’s transparency is another’s surveillance.  One person’s accountability is another’s 
persecution.  Where one stands on these issues depends on where on sits.”297  Most generally, accountability 
“refers to the nature of  a relationship between two parties.”298  The DFID’s definition is nearly identical to 
that used by Twaweza: “the process by which people are able to hold government to account,”299 yet does not 
shed much light on the actual content of  that “account.”  Newell and Bellour offer a more robust definition, 
proposing that accountability must be understood to have two key dimensions: answerability, “providing an 
account for actions undertaken,” and enforceability, “punishment or sanctions for poor or illegal 
performance.”300  This dual understanding raises a critical point.  It is not enough to understand 
accountability as a relationship in which authorities are obligated to answer to their constituents or clients 
(what Fox calls “weak accountability”301); enforcement mechanisms or channels must be in place to make this 
answerability actually mean something.   
 
A related point (one raised earlier) is that monitoring, information access, and the exercise of  citizen voice 
based on such information, is not accountability.  As Fox writes, “when only information access is 
present…an institution is transparent, but not accountable.”302  Similarly, even when information access 
might lead to the expression of  citizen needs, “voicing demands can strengthen accountability, but it will not 
on its own deliver accountable relationships.”303  It is not the information exchange or the vocalization of  
demands that makes accountability, it is rather the power to enforce concrete actions.  Accountability, then, 
must be understood as a relation of  power: “to apply accountability principles is to define who has the power 
to call for an account and who is obligated to give and explanation for their actions.”304  
 
As with monitoring, a number of  key questions can be asked in defining and specifying accountability: Goetz 
and Jenkins ask: “who is demanding accountability; from whom is accountability being sought; where – what 
forum—are they being held to account; how is accountability being delivered; and, for what are 
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people/institutions being held accountable?”305  These dimensions and others have been elaborated by a 
number of  writers and can be summarized as a series of  distinctions.  Accountability, as we see in the 
literature, can be internal or external; formal, informal or “rude”; vertical, horizontal, or direct; bottom-up or 
top-down; political, social or managerial; and individual or institutional.  We summarize these distinctions 
here:  
 
• Internal or external.306  Here we address the question of  where the impetus and enforcement 
comes from in relation to the institution being held to account.  Internal accountability is that which 
comes from inside an institution, self-imposed and self-enforced (though it can be accompanied by 
outside pressure and oversight).  Twaweza’s “external evaluation” is an example of  this kind of  
process.  External accountability comes from the outside, imposed or enforced by people or groups 
other than the institution itself.  This is the kind of  accountability that Twaweza refers to when it 
speaks of  “holding government to account.” 
 
• Vertical, horizontal, or direct.307  The question here is of  the institutional level from which 
accountability pressure comes, and is very related to the internal/external distinction.  Vertical 
accountability (a form of  external accountability) “is that which is demanded from below by citizens 
and civil society groups,”308 often through institutionalized processes such as elections and 
referendums.  Horizontal accountability (which can be internal or external) “refers to the capacity of  
state institutions to check abuses by other public agencies or branches of  government.”309  A third 
form of  accountability in this vein can be termed “diagonal accountability”310 and refers to “efforts 
which engage citizens directly in the workings of  horizontal accountability institutions.”311  In these 
structures, citizens develop and participate in formal or quasi-formal institutions capable of  directly 
enforcing accountability expectations, effectively “breaking the state’s monopoly over responsibility 
for official executive oversight.”312 
 
• Formal or informal.313  This is a distinction regarding the channels through which accountability 
action and enforcement are executed.  Formal accountability utilizes existing legitimate legal and political 
channels such as courts, comment and appeals processes, elections and formal oversight structures.  
Informal accountability uses informal, non-legal or non-institutionalized channels including shame, social 
exclusion, protest, complaint, blockade, obstruction or riot.   Hossain, studying accountability 
practices of  poor people in Bangladesh, names certain informal practices as forms of  “rude 
accountability,” which “work through shame and embarrassment, pressures to maintain reputation 
and status, and the threat of  violence.”314  F aced with daunting obstacles to the effective use of  
other forms of  action, Hossain contends that poor people seeking service improvements “have good 
reasons to use these methods in preference to formal accountability mechanisms.”315 
 
• Bottom-up or top-down.316  Here we refer to the nature of  the methods used to hold institutions 
or officials accountable.  Bottom-up methods (often also external and vertical) utilize non-hierarchical, 
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participatory processes that engage citizens directly in accountability actions.  Top-down methods utilize 
hierarchy and hierarchical processes, often imposed by one powerful institution on another (as in a 
court ruling).   
 
• Political, social or managerial.317  This is another distinction regarding the means (and, to some 
extent, the focus) through which accountability occurs.   Political accountability “consists of  checks and 
balances within the state including over delegated individuals in public office responsible for carrying 
out specific tasks on behalf  of  citizens.”318  It is “derived from the responsibilities of  delegated 
individuals in public office to carry out specific tasks on behalf  of  citizens,”319 and therefore requires 
a political context in which such a notion is accepted by both citizens and the state.  Social 
accountability “focuses on citizen action aimed at holding the state to account using strategies such as 
social 52ehavior52or52, press reports and legal action.”320  Managerial accountability, finally, refers to 
“financial accounting and reporting within state institutions, judged according to agreed performance 
criteria.”321  Twaweza appears to be interested primarily in a combination of  social and managerial 
accountability, with its actual work to date (primarily through Uwazi) leaning in the direction of  a 
managerial focus.   
 
• Individual or Institutional.322  Here, the question is one of  focus.  “While some [accountability 
initiatives] are intended to tackle corruption, and therefore focus on crime,” writes Fox, “others 
attempt to encourage improved institutional performance more generally.”323  Individual accountability, 
then, focuses on holding specific politicians, managers or service-providers accountable for their 
actions.  Work to reduce corruption of  specific officials or to increase staff  attendance at health 
clinics or schools are examples.  Institutional accountability, in contrast, targets institutional structures, 
patterns and procedures rather than individual behavior.  Work to ensure that budget entitlements are 
reaching their proper destinations is an example.   
 
• Provider-focused or Policy-focused.324  A final distinction can be made with regard to the focus 
of  accountability actions.  As Collier writes, “accountability in the provision of  public services can 
usefully be decomposed into a system for holding the service providing agency to account, and a 
system for holding the government to account.”325  Provider-focused accountability, or what Commins 
calls the “short route of  accountability”326 in regard to service provision is focused on holding those 
individuals and institutions who directly provide services to account for their work.  This type of  
action directly engages education, health and other suppliers in improving their provision activities 
and mechanisms.  Policy-focused accountability, or the “long route of  accountability,”327 focuses on the 
policy-makers and institutions which fund, oversee, and shape the conditions of  operation for service 
provision agencies.  Commins’ graphic representation of  these two “routes” is shown in Figure 8, 
below.   
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Figure 6: Long and Short Routes to Accountability (from Commins 2007). 
A final point must be made in closing our discussion of  definitions of  accountability.  The understandings 
outlined above are derived from academic writings and from conceptualizations mobilized by development 
workers and agencies.  Like all concepts, however, accountability must be understood as culturally-specific; 
the definitions described here are only one set of  possible ways of  understanding accountability and are 
derived from—and affirmative of—a specific set of  political, social and economic arrangements centered on 
Western notions of  governance, citizenship and responsibility.  These notions may not hold up in all East 
African contexts.  “In Africa,” Lange points out, “there appears to be a lack of  fit between the way local 
people think about accountability and the way that donor agencies and central government officials think 
about it.  Local ideas of  accountability are rooted in a patriarchal family mode of  thinking where an 
accountable leader/father provides for his constituency/family.”328  This is particularly important for an 
organization such as Twaweza, focused on mobilizing citizen-based modes of  accountability, to consider.  
How, in fact, do the specific definitions of  accountability implicit in Twaweza’s work match with those held 
by “ordinary citizens” on the ground?  How does/will Twaweza navigate the challenges of  conflicts that 
might arise between “local” notions of  accountability and those of  the development organization?  To whom is 
Twaweza accountable when it comes to deciding on what accountability actually means in practice?  
 
2. Constraining & Enabling Factors for Accountability  
 
Under what condition, we must ask, can efforts to build accountability between citizens and agencies or 
governments be successful?  What constraints do citizens and institutions face in enacting accountability 
relationships?  In our review of  the literature, we identify ten key factors that enable and constrain 
accountability: citizen capacity; rights; institutional mechanisms; institutional responsiveness and capacity; 
enforcement and sanctions; the issue of  multi-level governance; linkages between various forms of  
accountability; public culture; risk; and continuity and persistence.   
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• Capacity.  Effective accountability relationships require citizens to have access, on a regular and 
consistent basis, to knowledge, resources and power—the capacity necessary to enact these 
relationships and engage in accounting action.329  As Foresti et al.  write, “linking ‘voice’ and 
‘accountability’ can only be meaningful when citizens have the knowledge and power to make 
demands.”330   These dimensions have been explored in detail in earlier sections of  this report.   
 
• Rights.  Accountability relationships require there to be a structure and perception of  formal or 
informal rights through which responsibilities are designated and through which institutional 
behavior can be legitimately contested.  Accountability is severely limited or foreclosed, write Newell 
and Bellour, in a context where people lack “rights upon which to base accountability demands (lack 
of  effective rights, or lack of  actual rights due to limited or exclusionary citizenship).”331  This 
dimension harkens back to our earlier discussion of  issues surrounding citizenship: “citizenship is in 
many ways the concept that brings accountability and participation together.  Who has the right to 
hold to account and who should be held to account?  Who is entitled to participate in public (and 
private) decision making and who is not?”332  
 
• Institutional Mechanisms for Accountability.  Though not necessary for all forms of  
accountability action (see, for example, forms of  informal or “rude” accountability described above), 
the existence of  institutional mechanisms and structures through which accountability relationships 
are realized and formalized can be a crucial factor in determining the depth and strength of  citizen-
institution accountability.333  These mechanisms may include, among others, “competitive elections, 
auditing and evaluation, public hearings, third-party monitoring by a free press, and procedures for 
recall.334  Accountability is severely limited in a context in which “there are few institutionalized 
opportunities for citizens to participate in regular monitoring and evaluation of  government 
services.”335 
 
• Institutional Responsiveness and Capacity.  Perhaps the most important dimension of  
accountability—indeed, a core of  its very definition—is the response that institutions make to citizen 
demands.  As Fox states, “the power of  transparency, defined in terms of  the tangible impacts of  the 
public spotlight, depends in practice on how other actors respond.”336  Institutional responsiveness, 
of  course, can be severely constrained by the capacities of  the institutions and their agents.  Here we 
have an important distinction between two interrelated elements: the ways in which institutions 
respond to citizen demands and the abilities of  these institutions to respond.  Goetz and Gaventa, 
examining numerous citizen-based accountability efforts throughout the world, conclude finally that 
“the degree of  institutionalization of  the state, in terms of  the efficiency of  its bureaucracies and the 
probity of  its accountability institutions, is the main determinant for the effectiveness of  
responsiveness initiatives…state capacity is the bottom line in determining attentiveness to citizen 
voice and client focus in service delivery.”337 
 
• Enforcement, Sanctions and Incentives.  Institutions, assuming that they have the capacity to 
respond, are not likely to respond in the absence of  enforcement mechanisms, sanctions, and/or 
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incentives.338  While it is clear that “different forms of  accountability rely on different enforcement 
mechanisms,”339 researchers on accountability agree that “clear and credible procedures for 
sanctioning are required.”340  Accountability “is only as effective as the mechanisms it employs, and 
inconsequential accountability is not accountability at all.”341  
 
• Relations Between Forms & Levels of  Accountability.  The strongest accountability 
relationships appear to exist in cases in which the forms and levels of  accountability are multiple, 
overlapping and interconnected—in which institutions are held accountable through a number of  
different relationships and channels at once.  Horizontal accountability, write Newell and Bellour for 
example, “should be buttressed by strong vertical accountability in which citizens, mass media and 
civil associations are in a position to scrutinize public officials and government practice.”342  The 
converse is also the case.   
 
• Continuity and Persistence.  Goetz and Gaventa note the importance of  “a continuous presence 
of…observers throughout the process of  the agency’s work.”343  Singular actions for accountability 
are often not enough to generate a sustained response.  Institutional patterns and momentum are 
such that sustained work must be done by citizens or other agents of  accountability to ensure that 
the relationship is maintained.  This ongoing work, of  course, is hindered for citizens by the 
numerous factors that constrain agency discussed earlier in this report.   
 
• Public Culture.  Accountability in the absence of  a “public culture of  accountability” is difficult to 
cultivate and sustain.  As Steiner notes, such a culture “enhances the readiness of  the population to 
complain about the 55ehavior55or of  politicians and civil servants.”344  In its absence, citizens may 
be more likely to ignore or justify unaccountable or unjust behavior on the part of  service providers 
or public officials.  This issue, of  course, points back to our earlier discussion of  the complexities of  
navigating differing cultural conceptions of  accountability and public responsibility.   
 
• Risk.  Citizen action for accountability is likely to be constrained by any risks, perceived or real, that 
might be involved in making demands of  public institutions.  As Rai points out, “risk is…built into 
the exercise of  agency and needs to be assessed, minimized and addressed in order to expand the 
sphere of  freedom in which it is exercised.”345 
 
• Multi-Level Governance.  A final factor that must be considered as a potential constraint or enabler 
of  accountability is the contemporary reality of  multi-level governance.  As Newell and Bellour 
observe, “the challenge of  ensuring accountability is multiplied when political authority is shared, as 
it increasingly is, across a number of  levels from the local to the national to the regional to the 
global.”346  This appears to be particularly true in East Africa where political decentralization 
processes have created numerous layers of  governance and authority and where international donors 
and financial institutions exert strong influence on regional and national governance and policy.347 
“Given the interdependent nature of  different levels and forms of  accountability…and increased 
non-state involvement in accountability,” write O’Neil et al., “the functioning of  any one 
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accountability relationship, of  the effectiveness of  a donor intervention relating to such a 
relationship, is likely to be shaped by other accountability relationships.”348 
 
3. The Dangers of  Accountability  
 
We conclude our exploration of  accountability now with a brief  discussion of  some of  the dangers 
associated with this concept and practice that have been identified in the scholarly literature.  These are 
important for Twaweza to consider in tracing and taking responsibility for the potential effects of  adopting 
the accountability frame.  To be clear, we do not suggest that accountability should be abandoned as a 
concept because of  these dangers; rather, we propose that a recognition of  the dangers is crucial to 
effectively navigating them and making responsible choices.  The dangers of  accountability appear to be 
threefold, relating to issues of  complicity with neoliberal restructuring programs, avoidance of  structural 
questions of  political economy, and the closure of  political discourse around alternative possibilities for social 
and economic organization.   
 
A number of  authors have been concerned with ways in which discourses and practices of  accountability are 
bound up in free-market ideologies.  “The prevailing focus on state accountability, “ write Newell and Bellour, 
“can be understood in light of  prevailing notions about the appropriate relationship between states and 
markets and assumptions within neo-liberal ideology about the inefficiency and lack of  responsiveness of  
states to the needs of  citizens, defined as consumers.”349  Linked to discourses of  “good governance” that are 
quite common in international development circles, accountability may sometimes function as a language with 
which to levy critiques on states that justify restructuring, privatization and deregulation in the name of  
meeting citizens’ needs more effectively.  These notions often disguise the real exclusionary and undemocratic 
effects of  such neoliberal policies on communities, particularly the most vulnerable.  Kelsall, more specifically, 
discusses the ways in which anti-corruption “accountability” processes in Tanzania often “aim to press the 
subjectivity of  Tanzanians into a liberal-developmental mould.  Technical solutions, and political-cultural 
solutions, are inscribed each within the other.”350  Szeftel (1998) also links the anti-corruption agenda to a 
neoliberal development agenda.  To what extent, he asks, might “citizen monitoring” as an accountability 
strategy sometimes act as a form of  “outsourcing” as funding for government audit and monitoring capacity 
is cut by neoliberal adjustments?351  
 
Another concern revolves around discourses and political possibilities that accountability may sometimes 
serve to obscure.  In a general sense, the assumptions built into accountability discourses that accountable 
relationships are always possible may sometimes obscure real challenges in regard to the political and 
economic conditions facing East African governments.  There is a danger, Hyden notes, that a strong focus 
on accountability may “overlook the underlying structural conditions in Africa and assume that democratic 
forms of  governance can be built in just any condition.”352  
 
On the other side of  the coin, this accountability focus may—in reinforcing a specific set of  assumptions 
about the necessary political arrangements of  society and the rights and responsibilities that accompany 
them—risk closing off  conversations about the redistribution of  power.  In the case of  service provision, to 
what extent might a focus on accountability eclipse discussion and citizen imagination about different forms 
of  democratic, community-controlled service provision such that the state (for example) was not the 
institution that provided them or determined their allocation in the face of  citizen pressure?353  
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D. DOES MONITORING LEAD TO ACCOUNTABILITY? 
 
Having explored definitions and dimensions of  both monitoring and accountability, we are able now to 
examine the possible connections between the two.  Twaweza’s implication, as we have previously noted, is 
that monitoring—as a practice of  accessing, generating and communicating information (creating what Fox 
calls “transparency”354)—leads to accountability on the part of  government and service providers.  The 
literature is, however, less than clear with regard to this connection.  “The evidence on this approach,” writes 
Jameel, “is mixed.”355  Fox, taking an even more skeptical position, states that “the actual evidence on 
transparency’s impacts on accountability is not as strong as one might expect…after reviewing the empirical 
evidence for the assumed link between transparency and accountability, I have come to the conclusion that 
one does not necessarily lead to the other.”356 
 
If  there is to be a connection between monitoring and accountability, the specific mechanisms of  causal 
linkage would need to be identified.  How, precisely, does citizen access to information from monitoring (and, 
in many cases, the resulting public dissemination of  this information) lead to accountability? We can name at 
least three mechanisms, all of  which are highly dependent on context: shame, mobilization and threat.  Shame 
operates at the level of  social relationships and is a form of  informal, individual accountability.  Service 
providers or government officials, presumably concerned about their reputations, are pressured into acting 
accountably.  This hinges, of  course, on an actual concern; yet as Fox notes, “if  the power of  transparency is 
based on the ‘power of  shame’, then its influence over the really shameless could be quite limited.”357  
Mobilization—which Twaweza refers to in its discussion of  monitoring as a tool for citizen communication 
and coordination358 -- can be effective to the extent that information sparks citizen organizing and this 
organizing, in turn, successfully applies political pressure or exercises power in relation to service providers or 
politicians.  This mechanism is limited by all of  the dimensions of  citizen agency discussed earlier in this 
report.  Threat is a mechanism by which the fear of  citizen action, mobilization, or even the public 
dissemination of  certain forms of  information lead to policy or behavior changes in agencies and 
governments.  In general, it appears that the conditions under which each of  these mechanisms (and perhaps 
others) can actually work to generate accountability are difficult to pin down.  “It remains unclear,” writes 
Fox, “why some transparency initiatives manage to influence the 57ehavior of  powerful institutions, while 
others do not.”359  
 
Collier’s notion of  an “incentive system” does link monitoring and accountability in a clear way.  He proposes 
that “the concept of  accountability can…be decomposed into verifiable observation of  performance 
[monitoring] and a system of  rewards-penalties linked to the information so generated.”360   This structure 
must, however, be integrated into a single system for it to realize its full effectiveness.  In a manner that 
embodies Goetz and Jenkins’ notion of  “horizontal accountability”361 (discussed above), citizen monitoring 
must be institutionalized in a way that is linked to the power of  the rewards-penalties system.  This linkage is, 
however, difficult to make in a robust way.  Even when institutionalized, the power of  monitoring efforts to 
influence sanctions or rewards may be minimal: such oversight bodies “rarely have sufficient institutional 
clout to be able to act on their findings, whether by proposing mandatory sanctions, policy changes, 
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protection from violations, or compensation for past abuses.”362  
 
Robust linkages between monitoring and accountability are clearly limited by all of  the factors that might 
limit the effectiveness of  each element, as discussed above.  Three issues in particular may affect this linkage, 
namely, the free-rider problem, the issue of  capacity and power, and the danger of  capture by local elites.   
 
First, as Olken notes, “monitoring public projects is a public good, so there may be a serious free rider 
problem.”363  Particularly in a context in which resources and time are scarce, and perceptions of  the 
potential effectiveness of  accountability monitoring may be low, people are less likely to participate in an 
ongoing process that may happen without them.  “Whether one can actually control corruption by increasing 
monitoring in such an environment is an open, and important, empirical question.”364  
 
Second is the issue of  power, summarized effectively by Jameel:  
 
The goal of  community monitoring is ambitious: to make providers more accountable by 
making communities more active without actually changing who hires and fires providers.  
In addition to the coordination and free-riding challenges to collective action of  this kind, 
community members are usually poorer, less educated, and less connected than providers—
in other words they have less power.365 
 
Power is key.  Monitoring that is not linked with the power to enforce is unlikely to be effective and therefore 
can be very risky.  Put differently, “mobilizing community members to complain, without giving them the 
power to take decisive action, may not always work.”366  
 
The third issue is related to this challenge of  power.  Citizen monitoring is necessarily embedded in the social 
and political relations of  power in which citizens themselves are embedded.  The quality, consistency, use, 
dissemination, and communication of  information generated from monitoring actions may be affected by 
these relationships.  “Grass-roots monitoring,” says Bardhan, “may…be prone to capture by local elites.”367 
This is a paradox that merits further consideration: if  monitoring can be influenced and controlled by the 
very local elites that it seeks to hold accountable, then how effective can it be as a tool for generating further 
accountability?  
 
Shifting our focus from these more conceptual considerations, what does the empirical literature have to say 
about the links between monitoring and accountability?  Generally, Jameel suggests that “attempts to increase 
accountability to the poor had mixed effects on absence; some methods worked in some places, while similar 
methods failed in others.”368  In particular, “community-based mobilization and information has mixed 
results, is complex, and needs more study.”369  Positive linkages have been found, to be sure, but even these 
results do not offer the substantive evidence we would need to make conclusive statements about broader 
connections.  For example:  
 
• Bjorkman and Svensson found that, in a randomized field experiment on community monitoring of  
health provision in Uganda, this process did lead to increased accountability of  service providers to 
                         
362   Fox 2007, 664. 
363   Olken 2005, 2  
364   Olken 2005, 2 
365   Jameel 2009, 8 
366   Jameel 2009, 8 
367   Bardhan 2002; see also Bardhan and Mookherjee 2003 and Olken 2005, 2.   
368   Jameel 2009.   
369   Jameel 2009, 11 
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their clients and to an overall improvement of  service provision.370  It must be noted, however, that 
this research did rely on a monitoring process that was sponsored and facilitated by outside NGOs.  
The question of  whether such monitoring could be initiated and sustained by “ordinary citizens” 
working alone is an open (and, admittedly, dubious) one.   
 
• Deininger and Mpuga’s econometric analysis in Uganda found a positive correlation between 
“household knowledge on how to report inappropriate behavior by bureaucrats” and accountability 
and the quality of  services.371  Their study does not, however—and this is crucial for the discussion 
at hand—allow us to make strong conclusions regarding the causality of  these correlations.  In other 
words, while we may know that informed people are more likely to coexist with accountable 
institutions and quality services, we do not know whether—in any particular context—an increase in 
knowledge (as through monitoring) would also lead to an increase in accountability.  Correlation, as is 
well known, is not causation.   
 
Doubt about the connections between citizen monitoring and accountability have been cast by other studies.  
Olken’s randomized field experiment in Indonesia, for example, found that while the threat of  government 
audit did lead to a measureable decrease in resource capture by local elites, “grass-roots participation in the 
monitoring process only reduced missing wages, with no effect on missing materials expenditures.”372  Studies 
by Banerjee et al.  and by Nguyen and Lassibille, of  citizen monitoring efforts in India and Madagascar, 
respectively, showed similarly unfavorable results.373  
 
E. KEY QUESTIONS ON MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
¾ What dispositions and experiences foster a “monitoring-mindedness” on the part of  ordinary 
citizens? 
 
¾ Does the sustainability of  citizen monitoring and accountability assume positive responses on the 
part of  government?  What might be the implications of  this for Twaweza’s strategy? 
 
 
VI. IMPROVING BASIC SERVICES  
 
In our final section of  this report, we examine scholarly literature related to Twaweza's goal of  enabling 
"many more people to enjoy improvements in their lives with regard to quality basic education, health care, 
clean water and other areas that may be meaningful to them."374  Quite surprisingly, and despite the explicit 
focus in their purposes and goals statements, Twaweza's literature (to which we had access) says very little 
about the organization's focus on the sectors of  education, water, and health, about its understanding of  the 
contexts in which these services are currently provided (or not) throughout East Africa, or about the possible 
opportunities and challenges that strategic interventions by citizens (especially utilizing Twaweza's favored 
pathways of  information access and monitoring) face in regard to making improvements in service delivery.  
If  these dimensions have been unpacked in other documents, we do not find evidence of  any conclusions 
drawn or questions raised in the primary public literature of  Twaweza.375  
                         
370   Bjorkman and Svensson 2009.   
371   Deininger and Mpuga 2005.   
372   Olken 2005, 1.   
373 Banerjee et al.  2008; Nguyen and Lassibille 2008.  Interestingly, some of  the few studies that appear to have 
demonstrated more conclusive connections between monitoring and accountability have focused on "citizen report 
card" initiatives that Twaweza seems to somewhat disparage.  Balakrishnan and Sekhar's (2004) report on citizen 
report cards in Bangalore, India, for example, shows favorable results over time.   
374   Twaweza.  "Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.2.   
375 An exception to this silence is found in the "More Than a Thousand Miles" document (p.4-6) where there is some 
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Unlike in other sections, then, we have very little to examine or respond to on behalf  of  Twaweza in our 
research.  Also unlike other sections, the topic itself  does not lend itself  well to the kind of  question-raising 
literature surveys that we have been able to undertake within the constraints of  this project.  "Basic services 
in East Africa" names a wide and complex literature addressing details that vary considerably between and 
within the three countries in which Twaweza works.  As Jameel states, "the institutions that deliver public 
services are complex and the details matter."376  While Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya have much in common, 
they represent distinct fields of  practice when it comes to the provision of  basic services and a detailed 
survey of  water, health and educational service provision across the three countries is clearly beyond the 
scope of  this report.  Our approach, instead, in the absence of  material from Twaweza and in the context of  
an overwhelming body of  research, has been to engage in a general survey of  the literature on basic service 
provision in East Africa, and in developing nations generally, in order to raise critical issues and identify key 
questions for Twaweza to consider as it moves forward in its work.  In contrast to other sections of  this 
report, this examination of  basic service provision will be relatively brief, drawing substantially on the 
analytical and conceptual groundwork that has already been laid.   
 
This said, we do wish to use Twaweza's general suggestions about its approach to service provision as a 
launching point for our analysis.  Overall, we find in Twaweza's literature two key assumptions or 
propositions that shape this approach.  First, the organization appears to assume (by default of  not 
mentioning otherwise, at least) that the basic services of  water, health and education are primarily "public" 
services in East Africa.  This language invokes both a notion of  rights, linked to the state and to specific 
entitlements that citizens might claim over their access to quality services, and a specific duty of  the state to 
provide these services to citizens.  While it is the case that Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya have all, in various 
ways, enacted policy that expresses some form of  intention to provide citizens with these services (or, at least, 
with access to these services), this formal acknowledgement must be distinguished from any kind of  robust 
form of  enacted rights.  Moreover, as we shall explore in more detail below, statements of  intent from the state 
often coexist with a very complex, multi-layered and often extra-governmental reality of  on-the-ground 
service provision.  Services may be "public" in the sense that (some) citizens expect their governments to 
provide access, but they cannot be assumed to be publicly supported, governed, or monitored.   
 
A second key dimension to Twaweza's approach to the improvement of  basic services may be found precisely 
in its silence with regard to the details of  actual service provision structures.  Rather than engaging in any 
kind of  specific analysis, advocacy or detail-based campaign, Twaweza seeks to work at the "ecosystem" level 
via its strategies of  information access to "trigger" citizen agency.  It is left, presumably, to citizens to figure 
out how basic services work, who provides them where, to assess their quality, to diagnose their challenges 
and dysfunctions and to organize effectively to make changes.  The assumption chain goes something like 
this:  
 
• Basic services are basic, therefore must be important priorities to citizens. 
• Since (Twaweza conjectures) increased access to information leads to the enhanced exercise of  
effective citizen agency,  
• Then citizens will decide to exercise their agency in the realm of  these important services (via 
monitoring),  
• And this exercise of  agency will lead to an increase in the quality of  those services.   
 
 
                                                                               
anecdotal observation of  basic service availability and quality in villages visited by Twaweza staff.  These notes do 
not, however, constitute (or claim to be) a substantive analysis. 
376   Jameel 2009, 1. 
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To be fair, Twaweza acknowledges that citizens might exercise agency in other realms as well,377 but the 
organization's work remains (contradictions aside) rooted in an explicit focus on the three particular realms 
of  basic service provision.   
 
With these two key assumptions and dimensions in mind (the notion of  "public" services and the notion that 
citizens will be the effective transformative agents of  these services), we turn now to examine—with broad 
brush strokes—both the political and economic governance structure of  service provision in East Africa and 
the various obstacles that citizens (or, for that matter, anyone) might face in seeking to improve the quality of  
such services in the region.  Both of  these dimensions, we contend, are crucial to the work that Twaweza 
seeks to do and should be thoroughly considered in any organizational strategy for change.   
 
A. THE COMPLEX NATURE OF SERVICE PROVISION IN EAST AFRICA 
 
Far from being simply "public," the field of  service provision in East Africa spans a wide range of  possibility 
regarding how institutions may be organized, funded and governed and, thus, who is responsible and 
accountable for and to them.  Therkildsen and Semboja, in their study of  the region's service provision 
structure, contend that "in practice, the importance of  the state, voluntary and private sectors varies 
significantly among the three countries and types of  services.  Who provides what is socially and politically 
defined and constructed, and depends on past and present co-operative and conflictive relations."378  More 
specifically, they note that "resources do not just come from one or a few sources.  They originate from 
households (with men and women having different rights and obligations), POs, NGOs, all tiers of  
government, and from donors."379   Their assessment of  this complexity and of  the state of  research in its 
midst leads them to conclude that, "unfortunately information about the multitude of  such resource inputs is 
limited and incomplete."380  
 
In seeking to wrap our minds around this complexity, Cleaver (drawing on Merry et al.) offers a framework 
for understanding complexity in natural resources governance built around three dimensions of  what she 
calls "plurality."381  This framework may be useful in understanding service provision as well, since most 
generally, "such analyses of  plurality indicate the complexity of  the arenas in which the individual agency of  
rights bearers is exercised."382  These dimensions are:  
 
• Polycentric Governance.  This refers to the wide variety of  specific actors and organizations 
involved in basic services, including public, private, voluntary and complex combinations of  the 
three.   
 
• Institutional Pluralism.  This names the "multiplicity of  rules" that may be at play in a given 
service provision context such as, for example, "congruent traditional and modern water 'laws'."383 
 
• Multifunctionality.  This refers to the multiple uses of  and values of  a given resource or service, 
                         
377 And, we must note, this acknowledgement is voiced with no small bit of  self-doubt: "what if  water, health and 
education are not at all the key areas in which people will want to/are able to exercise agency?" (Twaweza.  
"Twaweza: How Does Change Happen?" p.7.).  This is a crucial question.   
378 Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 6.  Lange notes these complexities as well, even tracing the breakdown of  public 
service provision to them (Lange 2008).   
379 Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 9.  A huge portion of  funding for education, health and (presumably) water comes, 
for example, from external sources (donors).  In Tanzania in 1994, more than 50% of  state-funded education & 
health was supported by external donors (Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 17).   
380   Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 9. 
381   Cleaver 2009, 132; Merrey et al.  2006, 212. 
382   Cleaver 2009, 132. 
383   Cleaver 2009, 132. 
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as when, for example, a water pump becomes a source of  personal or family income (selling water 
to neighbors) in order to make debt payments.   
 
To summarize, we can examine service provision complexity in terms of  different forms of  governance 
(different types of  service providers), different rules which shape service provision, and different functions 
which services may play in a given context.  While all of  these are crucial, we will focus on the more widely-
applicable question of  "polycentric governance" that characterizes the provision of  basic services throughout 
East Africa.384 In this regard, the literature identifies a number of  institutional forms through which services 
are currently provided:  
 
Public.  East African governments certainly do provide some basic services to some of  their citizens, though 
the amount of  such provision varies substantially from country-to-country and across sectors.  In the 1990s, 
for example, Therkildsen and Semboja identified government service provision as the primary structure 
(though varying by local and national government provision) for education in Tanzania and Kenya, while 
Uganda's voluntary sector ranked higher.385  In the domain of  health care, government provision was found 
to lag behind both private and voluntary sector provision in all three countries.386  In the realm of  water 
provision, Tanzania's focus remains primarily on public sector provision (despite significant forays into 
privatization experiments),387 while Kenya's Water Act of  2002 mandated a significant privatization of  the 
country's water provision sector.388   Uganda's water sector is significantly public, though has strong private 
participation as well.389   These variations are far from being internally consistent.  Because of  the various 
political manifestations of  decentralization programs across the three countries, responsibility for the 
provision of  these basic services also varies widely in terms of  localized versus centralized control and 
responsibility.  Such differences matter, for they determine the flow of  financial resources, the loci of  
decision-making power and the levels on which both managers and politicians must be held to account.390  
 
Private.  Particularly under the influence of  structural adjustment programs and other forms of  policy 
influence from international financial institutions and donors, East African countries have been engaged in 
various privatization processes and efforts with regard to basic services.391  Once again, these efforts vary 
widely across countries and sectors as noted by Therkildsen and Semboja.392  Of  particular distinction, 
though a difference for which it is hard to find empirical data, is the breakdown between for-profit and non-
profit NGO-based private service provision.  It is clear that donor organizations of  all types play a dramatic 
role in both supporting public sector services and in providing services themselves.  Donors fund, for 
example, nearly fifty percent of  total health care provision in Tanzania393 and private non-profits run forty-
two percent of  Uganda's hospitals.394  Within the large realm of  private service provision, the actual 
structures vary widely: "private sector involvement can be seen as a continuum of  options ranging from 
                         
384 The question of  differing rules and functions is equally as important and must be considered in on-the-ground 
work to improve services.  It is however, a set of  issues that cannot be adequately addressed through the study of  
scholarly literature alone; it requires, quite substantially, empirical study of  specific places and contexts.   
385  Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 7. This situation changed in the second half  the 1990s. Their work is instructive, 
however, for its findings. 
386   Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 7. 
387   Gine and Perez-Foguet 2008. 
388   K'Akumu 2006. 
389   Mabasi 2010. 
390   Yilmaz et al.  2010; Francis and James 2003; Mamdani and Bangser 2004; Palloti 2008. 
391   Alexander 2003.  Ngowi offers a typical justification of  this process with regard to the supposed inefficacy of  
public institutions: "Such a sector therefore is inadequate in the whole exercise of  effectively, efficiently and 
sustainably producing, rendering and improving the needed quantity and quality of  goods and services.  The 
private sector therefore can be seen as the next best and more sustainable alternative" (Ngowi 2005, 4).   
392   Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 7. 
393   Shiner 2003. 
394   Tashobaya et al.  2007. 
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supply and civil work contracts to management contracts and concession type of  arrangements."395  These 
differences matter with regard to the question of  who can and should be held accountable by citizens for the 
services in question.   
 
Private-Public Partnerships.  These hybrid structures, which also take many specific and different 
institutional forms, appear to be growing in popularity throughout the region.396  Uganda's Public Private 
Partnership for Health initiative outlines a process whereby public and private agencies will collaborate on 
issues as extensive as "policy development, coordination and planning; resources management including 
financial resources mobilization and allocation, and human resources for health development and 
management; services delivery including management and provision of  health services and community 
empowerment and involvement."397  Tanzania's Health Sector Reform process, similarly, holds public-private 
partnerships as one of  its key strategies.398  These programs, in varying ways, blur lines regarding issues of  
accountability and how citizens might interface with the governance and implementation of  basic services.399  
 
Voluntary Sector.  The "voluntary sector," a broad category that refers to non-monetized activity taking 
place outside of  the institutional frameworks of  private or public agencies, has always played a major role in 
the meeting of  basic needs in East African communities.400   These can be formally-organized community 
associations, such as the much-studied Harambee Movement401, or—perhaps more predominately—informal 
groups of  people developing family or community solutions to basic service needs.402  In the case of  these 
voluntary sector initiatives, issues of  accountability and the improvement of  basic services are likely to be 
intimately bound up with questions of  social relations of  power at the family and community level, as well as 
political relations at the level of  local authorities.  Unless Twaweza envisions the eventual replacement of  
such community-based institutions by government-provided public services (which does not appear to be the 
case), then work to "trigger" citizen agency must thoughtfully and delicately navigate the complexities of  
these profoundly socially-embedded forms of  service provision organization.  What role does information 
and monitoring play (if  any) in such contexts?  How would support and networking on the part of  an 
external development organization such as Twaweza look different when engaging in community-based 
service provision improvement rather than in accountability work via the state?  
 
International Financial Institutions.   A further consideration in the realm of  basic service governance is 
the role of  international financial institutions in constraining and enabling certain forms of  service provision 
and not others.  While international institutions are most often directly involved in service provision only in 
the role of  funder (a powerful role, to be sure), their influence on national and regional-level policy may 
sometimes contribute greatly to shaping the "ecosystem" in which service provision takes place.  Shiner 
summarizes in the domain of  health care:  
 
 
                         
395  Ugaz 2003, 3. 
396  Ugaz 2003. 
397  Tashobaya et al.  2007. 
398  Tanzanian-German Programme to Support Health.  http://www.tgpsh.or.tz/public-private-partnership.html.   
Accessed 9/6/10. 
399  Miraftab 2004. 
400  Hyden 2006. 
401  Mwiria 1990. 
402  To the extent that basic service provision occurs in the context of  societies with strong informal interpersonal 
networks—that often might take precedence over formal networks and institutions--how must our 
conceptualization of  the exercise of  "agency" work?  Another way to frame this: if  "citizens" are people 
constituted as agents in relation to a formal polity, and if  people in East Africa are often acting not as citizens but 
as members of  community, then what does this mean for agency?  In relation to services?  How much of  the 
agency necessary to transform service delivery must come from "citizens" and how much from "community 
members"?  
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International financial institutions provide aid in the form of  grants and loans, with the 
condition that the recipient country meets requirements set out in the economic recovery, 
structural adjustment, and poverty reduction strategy programmes that they endorse.  
Such conditions include economic reforms that either directly affect the financing of  
health care or indirectly affect health through the effect of  economic change on 
welfare.403 
 
Alexander's research identifies numerous specific financial and policy mechanisms through which institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank exert influence on the form and governance of  
service provision in developing countries.404  In seeking to identify the leverage points at which citizens might 
exercise power in holding service providers and governments accountable, we must keep in mind that "many 
developing country governments are 'outwardly' accountable to external donors and creditors" and are 
therefore limited in their ability to be "inwardly" accountable to their citizens.405  How does Twaweza account 
for this macro-scale issue in its work?  Are consideration made, for example, regarding the importance of  
information about the role of  international financial institutions in shaping East African economic and 
political contexts?  What about citizen "monitoring" of  these institutions or the national governments that 
are engaged in negotiating condition-filled loan agreements for international aid?  Indeed, when Twaweza 
talks about enabling citizen agency, does this include work that might enable citizen-based social movements 
that are seeking to contest externally-imposed policies that they perceive might lead to the reduction or 
eclipse of  citizen control of  basic services?  
 
B. OBSTACLES TO IMPROVING SERVICE PROVISION 
 
Even if  citizens are able to navigate the complex corridors of  institutional service provision to identify ways 
in which they might hold (someone, who?) accountable, numerous obstacles may remain on the road to 
effecting an increase in the quality of  services.  Reviewing the literature, we identify a number of  these, some 
of  which have been covered earlier with regard to issues of  citizenship, agency, access to information and 
accountability:  
 
• Rights.  As discussed in our exploration of  accountability, people must--in the case of  public 
provision, at least--have both an institutionalized right to demand service improvements and a sense 
of  that right.   
 
• Political Will.  As a number of  authors identify, there must be political will on the part of  
authorities to both provide basic services and to work towards their improvement.406   
 
• Funding.  Clearly, there must be adequate funds available to implement and improve services.407 
This is a significant obstacle in many cases, yet as Besley and Ghatak remind us, "public spending and 
outcomes are not necessarily related."408  
 
• Material Resources.  In addition to financial resources, there must often be material resources 
available in order to facilitate effective services.409  Perhaps the most obvious example is in the realm 
of  water: during severe drought, there is little possible relief.    
 
                         
403   Shiner 2003, 829. 
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407   Ugaz 2003; Penny et al 2007; Devarajan and Reinikka 2002; Mamdani and Bangser 2004; Besley and Ghatak 2007.   
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• Corruption.  The frequently cited misuse or misappropriation of  funding is a critical obstacle to 
improving service provision and may not be easily transformed.410   
 
• Incentives to Provide Services.  As Devarajan and Reinikka identify, "even when the money 
reaches the primary school or health clinic, the incentives to provide the service are often very 
weak."411  Teacher and health provider absenteeism are notable symptoms of  this challenge.   
 
• Skill & Knowledge.  Effective, high-quality services require skilled providers and managers, which 
are often in short supply due to economic, educational and other constraints.412  
 
• Mismatch.  Ugaz identifies that there can often be a "mismatch" between the form and content of  a 
given service and the actual needs and desires of  the population.413 This may be particularly true in 
cases in which obstacles to participation are high.   
 
• Urban Bias.  Some observers have noted a strong urban bias in service provision, in which 
economic inequities are compounded by spatial inequities.414  
 
• Accountability.  The degree of  accountability that a given service provider--and the broader 
institutions and conditions in which they are embedded--has will profoundly influence service 
provision quality.415  This has been discussed earlier in detail.   
 
• Information about Coverage and Quality.  It is often difficult for citizens and service providing 
institutions to know the extent to which services are needed, how well they are currently being 
provided, who is providing them, and how well this is happening.416  This is one dimension in which 
Twaweza's work seems particularly useful, though actual improvements in service provision quality 
are likely to require changes in other dimensions as well.    
 
• Coordination and Linkage.  Articulations at various scales between institutions, sectors and 
governance domains are crucial in determining the provision of  services, their quality and the 
responsiveness of  institutions to citizen pressure.417  
 
Many of  these dimensions will sound familiar, linked to our earlier discussions of  constraints and enabling 
factors for both the exercise of  citizen agency and the effective construction of  relationships of  
accountability.  These are, most fundamentally, issues of  power and the relationships between "ordinary 
citizens" and the larger institutions and contexts with which they engage.  Any approach to imagining, 
encouraging or "triggering" citizen-based action to improve lives and livelihoods must take these elements 
into account.   
 
C. FURTHER QUESTIONS  
 
We close this section with two final, and much broader, questions raised by the scholarly literature on 
improving basic services: who defines "basic," and who defines "better"?  The first question is raised by the 
                         
410   Mamdani and Bangser 2004; Francis and James 2003.  See also World Bank 2010. 
411   Devarajan and Reinikka 2002, 3.  See also Besley and Ghatak 2007; Mamdani and Bangser 2004. 
412   Penny et al 2007; Besley and Ghatak 2007; Mamdani and Bangser 2004. 
413   Ugaz 2003, 8. 
414   Ugaz 2003, 8; Devarajan and Reinikka 2002, 3. 
415   Mamdani and Bangser 2004. 
416   Gutierrez 2007. 
417   Gutierrez 2007; Lange 2008; Francis and James 2003. 
Miller, Hartwell & Rossman, Unpacking Twaweza’s Theory of  Social Change                                   page 65 
 
work of  De Walle, who studies the politics of  how services are defined (or not) as "basic" or "essential." 
Some services, and not others, he observes, are "considered as ‘essential’ services, the lack of  which for an 
individual or a group of  individuals is to be considered as problematic and to be remedied by some type of  
(government?) intervention."418  The question of  what is included in the category of  "essential" is not simply 
one of  objective necessity nor of  basic public opinion; these are, rather, highly political decisions.  The 
contest over what is considered "basic" is a contest about rights, which is, therefore, also a contest about what 
is to be protected as a public good and what is to be left to the private market.   
 
If  water, health, and education are "basic," then this implies (in many domains of  Western political sensibility, 
though not all) a social and moral obligation (often via the state) to provide access for everyone in society (or, 
at least all "citizens").  Yet what about food, housing, transportation, energy, communication, jobs, or income? 
Calling some of  these "basic" might threaten certain assumptions about what should be left to the "private 
domain," or about what is (or is not) a moral obligation.  In societies shaped by capitalist value systems, the 
notion of  an adequate income as a "basic" social obligation may not be popular with those who believe that 
poverty is an effective incentive against "free-riding."  The point is this: the definition of  "basic" is not always 
simple, and can be an ideological and political issue as much (or more) than it is one of  simple need.  Such a 
recognition must carry us back to our earlier questions about Twaweza's tension between both "targeting" 
certain form of  services and, at the same time, claiming not to target any particular domain of  citizen action.  
Who, in the end, gets to decide what is basic, what is important?  
 
The second question is also one of  definition, but in this case in regard to the quality of  services.  Here, we 
recognize with Leonard et al.  that varying definitions of  "better services" or of  "service improvement" can 
lead to very different perceptions with regard to the effects of  various service-oriented change actions.  
Leonard et al., examining dynamics of  attendance at health clinics in rural Tanzania, sometimes "observe 
people leaving villages in which there is a high quality clinic to seek care at a low quality clinic further 
away."419   While initially puzzling, it became clear that people hold differing definitions of  "quality."  Other 
studies of  clinic quality in the area, Leonard et al. point out, measured "the number of  beds, number of  
doctors, hours open per week, drug availability and services provided,"420 none of  which were measures that  
made sense out of  the pattern of  patient mobility.  Studying actual patient preferences, however, they found 
that "patients seek facilities that provide high quality consultations, are staffed by more knowledgeable 
physicians, observe prescription practices, and are polite."421  The relevant point that we take here for 
Twaweza is that "objective" measures of  improvement in the quality of  basic services may not exist.  In 
seeking to engage citizens with such work, and in seeking to evaluate impacts in the long-run of  its own work, 
Twaweza must begin with the quality-definitions of  citizens themselves.   
 
LINKS II & III: CITIZEN AGENCY AND THE IMPROVEMENT  
OF BASIC SERVICES 
 
We arrive now at the question of  linkages between citizen agency and the improvement of  basic services, 
posed in Twaweza's theory of  change.  Because we have touched on many dimensions of  this linkage earlier 
in the report, this section will serve primarily to raise a few further questions.  This linkage has two primary 
dimensions: first, the question of  how citizens do, in fact, exercise agency with relation to basic services? The 
second question has been posed previously: what if  citizens do not choose to exercise agency in the direction 
of  seeking improvements in basic services (or, more precisely, in the basic services that Twaweza identifies as 
central)?  
Therkildsen and Semboja provide an excellent overview of  the various ways that households in East Africa 
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have been found to respond to increasing obstacles to service access, or to low-quality services:  
 
• "They may be cut off  from service benefits by deliberate choice or economic compulsion."422  
Sometimes people simply do not act.  For a wide variety of  reason--presumably related to some 
combinations of  the issues identified in this report as obstacles to exercising agency, people must 
cope with a lack of  access or with very low-quality services.   
 
• "They may switch to a lower quality service."423  Faced with obstacles to accessing services of  higher 
quality (outlined earlier), people resort to those services which are available, more accessible, but may 
be of  significantly lower quality.   
 
• They may seek means of  meeting personal and family needs through private arrangements, such as 
paying for access to tap water, hiring a tutor, and going to the private pharmacy to get medications 
and drugs. 
 
• "They may search for cheaper outlets."424  This may involve greater travel time, greater risk, poorer 
quality or the undermining of  social support for more "public" options (as in the case where private 
options are cheaper, even if  due only to increased exploitation of  labor or the externalization of  
social and environmental costs).   
 
• "They may join others to provide services collectively."425  When resources are available, and the 
social conditions are amenable, cooperative or collective solutions may be organized.  In other 
circumstances--particularly in situations of  unequal access to resources and the absence of  social 
mechanisms to collectivize power and access--people may often resort to private provision of  
services to others in the community.  Thus, as has been offered as an example earlier, a water pump 
purchased by loan may become a source of  income and an effective move toward further 
privatization of  resource access.   
 
• They may advocate for lower obstacles and higher quality in existing, currently-utilized services.426  
Finally, we arrive at the outcome that Twaweza seeks to encourage.  It is, indeed, a possible action 
that citizens might take.  Suffice it to say, however, that it is far from the only option and--in many 
circumstances--may not be the most likely.   
 
Some key questions that must be asked in any given (specific, grounded) context include:  Which of  these 
options are most desirable, tenable, and, ultimately, might lead to improved access, equity and quality in public 
services?  What specific processes and conditions might facilitate a person, household or group to pursue one 
path and not the other?  Under what circumstances, and with what enabling factors and resources, would 
someone pursue the desirable pathways toward genuine improvement in public services?  
 
The second question has been raised earlier, but is worth repeating and elaborating: what if  citizens don't want 
to exercise agency through the improvement of  basic services?  Another way to raise this question is to 
propose that the goals of  "improving basic services" and "enabling citizen agency" may or may not be 
congruent.  They are linked only to the extent that citizens choose basic services, provided through the state, as 
the locus of  their action.  Should they choose otherwise, then the current theory of  change advanced by 
Twaweza ceases to hold up.  We come face-to-face, again, with the question of  how Twaweza navigates the 
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tension (even, perhaps, the contradiction) between advocating for "enhanced citizen agency" and maintaining 
a strong focus on basic services and their improvement via information access and monitoring.   
 
This issue cuts across all dimensions of  Twaweza's work.  If  citizen agency is the goal, then would Twaweza 
choose to focus on the other three dimensions specifically (information, monitoring and services)? Wouldn't 
Twaweza, instead, seek to explicitly identify obstacles to citizen agency and self-organization on-the-ground 
and then work to support this? In the realm of  information, we can see that if  "improving basic services" 
provided by the government is the locus of  action (rather than agency), then it may be true that information 
of  the type that Twaweza focuses on is crucial to effective action.  But it is just as clear that not all effective 
citizen action requires the same kinds of  information (and thus the same kinds of  access to information).  Putting 
resources into access to information or monitoring activities in light of  having decided on the sphere of  citizen 
action "beforehand" means not putting those resources into other kinds of  enabling information, or into 
other kinds of  enabling activities.  Again, where should the decision lie regarding the form that citizen agency 
should take?  Who has the power to shape this through funding and other resource leverage?  How is 
Twaweza taking explicit responsibility for the power that comes with this role?427  
 
LINK IV: CLOSING THE CIRCLE: BASIC SERVICES AND  
CITIZEN AGENCY (THROUGH INFORMATION)  
 
We have arrived at the final linkage in Twaweza's model, and one that is perhaps the least explicit in the 
organization's literature.  Basic services, this link indicates, are crucial elements in the enabling of  citizen 
agency.  Twaweza acknowledges this link briefly in its "Theory of  Change" document, stating that "better 
basic services, more effective use of  public resources and accountable government will contribute to 
strengthening human capability and citizen agency."428   This statement, we suggest, is more crucial to the 
elaboration of  Twaweza's work than its sparse presence in the organization's literature would suggest.   All 
other dimensions of  its theory aside, if  Twaweza seeks to build a robust conceptual or causal linkage between 
the various dimensions of  its work—particularly between the improvement of  services and the notion of  
"citizen-driven change"—it must be done at this point of  connection.  Basic services must be conceptualized 
as offering a significant response to some of  the limiting factors of  resource access and inequity that make 
the exercise of  citizen agency difficult.  Sen's capability approach (reviewed earlier in this report), which 
Twaweza subtly invokes in its above statement of  linkage, can provide a robust framework for theorizing 
these connections.  It may bear fruit for Twaweza to explore this pathway more thoroughly. 
 
Such exploration does not, of  course, enable a sidestepping of  some of  the sticky questions involved in this 
linkage that have been raised earlier:  Who decides which basic services are most "basic" and will most 
effectively enable an increase in citizen agency and action?  Of  all of  the constraining or enabling dimensions 
of  citizen agency for Twaweza to choose, why choose "basic services" as the primary point of  intervention? 
Why not choose other points?  On what basis have these choices been made?  Has a strategic analysis of  
potential intervention points led to such a narrowing of  focus? If  so, who participated in that process? Who 
                         
427 There is another dimension to this question as well, but from a more "strategic" standpoint with regard to 
leveraging resources for social change.  It may well be the case that basic services need to be a priority for 
development work, but we also need to think strategically about this: If  the goal--the ultimate goal—is a robust, 
empowered citizenry capable of  advocating for (or meeting!) their own basic (and nonbasic) needs, then we need 
to open up the possibility that an approach starting with advocacy for basic needs might not be the only strategy.  
Anne Larson argues, in her study of  decentralization in Nicaragua, that natural resources might serve as a useful 
leverage point (Larson 2005).  But, she says, "local leaders...may be more likely to ignore natural resources and 
concentrate on the service and infrastructure investments that many consider to be their top priority" (Larson 
2005, 10).  The question is: what is the most effective leverage point to begin to built robust democratic power-
from-below?  Of  course basic services must be on the radar, but are they the most effective place to start?  Where 
might democratic decentralization--of  the "downward accountability" type—most effectively begin to succeed in 
ways that then open up possibility for further transformation?  
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had a voice and who did not?  
  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The broad question that our identification of  these complex dimensions raises for Twaweza, we believe, is 
essentially this: Can the provision of  information access and support for monitoring actually lead to effective 
results in the face of  so many challenges?  If  so, how, specifically, does Twaweza envision this effect to occur? 
There is no doubt that one organization cannot meaningfully and effectively address even half  of  these issues 
alone, and nor do we intend to imply as much.  What we do suggest is that the crucial, small work of  any one 
organization—particularly one seeking to link as many spheres and dimensions as Twaweza in its vision of  
change—be explicitly connected with an acknowledgement of  the larger context in which it works.  An 
effective theory of  change must engage the hard questions head-on and seek to articulate provisional, open-
ended ideas about how these questions might be addressed.  Sidestepping issues of  power and the profound 
challenges of  inequity and participation—even in the guise of  an "ecosystem approach"—will not ultimately 
be helpful to the long-term work of  imagining new pathways for change.   
 
Yet neither do we wish for our critical questions to be understood as pessimistic nay-saying.  Far from 
believing that the challenges we have identified indicate the impossibility of  people-driven change, we see 
them as crucial ingredients in a learning process through which substantive and strategic change can be truly 
imagined.  Even those elements that we have identified (drawing from the work of  others) as "structural 
constraints" should be read as tools for thinking rather than as objective determinants of  any transformative 
process.  Problems and challenges are opportunities for learning.  Looking Goliath in the eye is the first step 
to believing that David is capable of  what previously seemed impossible.   
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